In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

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54-9

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Security

OFFICE LETTER NO. D-64/36 Date: September 3, 1964

TO : Regional Security Supervisors
Regional Security Officers
Security Officers (Technical)

FROM : Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security

SUBJECT: Contacts with Soviet and Communist Bloc Nationals

CA-1471 of August 6, 1964, entitled Contacts With Soviet and Communist Bloc Nationals, sets forth specific briefing requirements for RSOs and PSOs concerning clerical personnel.

RSOs should insure that PSOs in their areas are aware of CA-1471 and are complying with the briefing requirements.

Future Security Surveys should include under Section IV - D, Reporting of Contacts Policy, action taken by the post to implement the instructions contained in CA-1471.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

17-4 Com Bloc-US

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CA-1471,
NO.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATE OF AMERICA
HANDLING INDICATOR
10 AUG 1964
TEHRAN

TO All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

RECEIVED AT CONSULAR SECTION AMERICAN EMBASSY
AUG 18 1964
TEHRAN

Posts	Action	Infor
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Aug 6 1 26 PM '64

FROM Joint STATE, USIA, AID, and ACDA Instruction

DATE:

SUBJECT: Contacts with Soviet and Communist Bloc Nationals

REF CA-5672, January 15, 1960

The marked loosening of Soviet control over Eastern European regimes and the increasing diversity and nationalism have resulted in a sharp increase in the value of Eastern European officials as sources of political, economic, and intelligence information. All posts are therefore instructed to review their efforts to develop and exploit these sources. At the same time, the interested agencies wish to establish a world-wide system to record and control contacts by American personnel with Soviet and Communist bloc nationals. Such a system will provide a global pattern of Soviet and bloc social efforts and will assist substantive offices to look for and analyze shifts in the attitudes of bloc countries towards the U. S.

Equally important, the system will protect American personnel who have contacts with bloc nationals. Regarding the latter point, Soviet bloc officials are known to report assiduously on their Western contacts. Some of these reports have filtered back into American security organizations and are frequently embellished with inaccuracies, fabrications and faulty assessments. The value of being able to reconstruct a factual account from American sources is obvious.

Officers whose assigned duties involve official contact with members of the Communist bloc are reminded that they shall prepare memoranda covering substantive conversations. Such memoranda should be submitted promptly through appropriate agency channels to the principal officer or his designee. All officers who encounter Communist bloc members

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GROUP 2

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: EUR:SOV:WHPerkins:OS:SY:MWKnaufer 4/15/64

Coordination and Classification Approved by: O - William J. Crockett

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ACDA-Mr. Donelan; ARA-Mr. L[illegible]; FE-Mr. Pazdral; NEA - Mr. [illegible]; FE-Mr. Macdonald

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RM/AN HALL

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INT

members, whether as a result of their duties, at social engagements, or on informal occasions, must submit written memoranda covering any substantive aspect of the contact. When conversations with Communist bloc personnel (in this case not normally construed to include Yugoslavs) have been limited to mundane pleasantries or innocuous subjects which are of no reportable value, the incident will nevertheless be reported to the principal officer or his designee, who will maintain a record of such contacts. A report covering all types of official, social, and chance contacts should be made to the Department by the officer controlling these contacts on a routine but current basis. Contacts with significant overtones must be, of course, reported on priority. These reports will be disseminated to the interested areas in the Department and coordinated with the represented agencies in Washington.

Regional Security Officers and Post Security Officers conducting routine security briefings should advise all clerical personnel that contact with Soviet or Communist bloc personnel is generally undesirable. Casual, unofficial, chance contact may be unavoidable under certain situations and should not, of course, be an occasion for rudeness. However, such contacts should be as brief as good taste allows, conversation should be limited to social amenities, and no effort should be made to arrange future social relationships. These casual contacts at clerical and staff levels are also of continuing interest and concern to the Department and should be routinely reported by the control officer to the Department on the same basis as the contacts enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs.

RUSK

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Hold 8-30-71 bjb

Soviet Intelligence

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST AMERICANS AND U. S. INSTALLATIONS ABROAD

AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE

July 1968

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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I. INTRODUCTION

"A 1959 directive of the leadership of the Committee for State Security [KGB] entitled 'On Intensifying Operations Against Americans Abroad' assigns important tasks to KGB residencies. It directs increased efforts to recruit Americans working in all types of U.S. Government installations abroad; Americans in embassies, in military units and on the staffs of military blocs. Also included in the scope of the directive are Americans assigned to international organizations, overseas representatives of scientific institutions and business firms, news correspondents, students, etc."

(Top Secret 1962 KGB Training Manual: "The Recruitment of Americans in the United States and Abroad.")

Nature of the Soviet Operational Program

To the Soviet Government, and to the Soviet intelligence services in particular, the United States is the "main enemy," a term appearing in numerous Soviet documents. Against this "main enemy," the Soviet intelligence services have developed over the years and are today conducting concerted, world-wide programs to probe, seek out and recruit Americans—official and private, civilian and military—in order to penetrate our agencies, acquire our cryptographic systems, intercept our courier communications, discover our military-related research and development, etc. In this effort, the Soviets bring to bear the conviction that Americans are essentially materialistic, motivated principally by monetary need or greed, and can therefore be "bought" to serve Soviet interests.

This study describes and illustrates by examples an important threat to the security of the United States—the systematic and intensive program by the Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) and GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) to recruit Americans abroad and penetrate U.S. installations.

It also pictures the average American overseas as he is seen through the eyes of Soviet Intelligence—primarily interested in money and making more of it, typically indifferent to the means and often to the risks, a person with his guard down, talkative by nature, easier to approach abroad than he is at home. This provocative portrait is not imaginary; it is part of Soviet Intelligence doctrine and will emerge throughout this study in direct quotations from KGB documents. The actual case examples cited, some in detail, will show the doctrine in practice. There will be particular emphasis on a parallel Soviet concept that certain categories of Americans, such as enlisted military personnel, junior embassy employees, and students are, in effect, "second class citizens" and thus particularly worthwhile targets for aggressive Soviet intelligence officers and their agents.

The Soviet program, as it has been observed on a world-wide basis, parallels and supplements Soviet espionage operations within the United States. One of its principal aims is to acquire abroad American agents who have the potential and can be directed to serve Soviet espionage interests in the United States in various branches of the Federal Government, in the military services, in political parties and in scientific and technological institutions and industries.

Consistent with Soviet Intelligence priorities inherent in the "main enemy" concept, Americans outside the United States in both official and nonofficial capacities have, whenever possible, been targets for recruitment. In early 1951 instructions went out from Moscow to Soviet intelligence personnel outside the USSR to step up already existing operational activity against Americans. The instructions were repeated in the spring of 1953 and again in December of the same year. The 1958

KGB leadership directive cited in the quotation at the head of this study reflects a Soviet policy-level decision to further increase the scope of the operational effort. Classified Soviet material of considerably more recent date is also available which documents the enlargement of the Soviet threat and the increased operational sophistication which is today being brought to bear against Americans abroad.

In recent years all KGB "trusted contacts" and agents, whatever their nationality or activity, are known to have been reappraised for possible direction against the American target. There is available much reliable information to confirm that both the KGB and GRU are working with intense concentration against Americans and U.S. installations abroad and that they have scored successes.

The Soviet Services

It is unnecessary to go into fine points of organizational and technical distinction between the Soviet intelligence services [illegible] their respective jurisdictional spheres, but bri[illegible]nention of the major components most active in the global operations program against Americans abroad is basic to understanding of the program itself.

a. First and foremost of these components is the KGB's Foreign Directorate (also known as the First Chief Directorate) which outside the borders of the USSR has primary responsibility for clandestine positive intelligence collection—political, military, economic and scientific—as well as for highly specialized covert activities to influence policies and actions of foreign governments. The Foreign Directorate also has the responsibility for counterintelligence abroad, including penetration of all foreign security and intelligence services. KGB staff officers assigned abroad under diplomatic, trade and other forms of official cover are under the immediate direction of appropriate geographic departments of the Foreign Directorate. It has been noted in recent years that officers with American Department experience are being sent increasingly to posts remote from the United States on the tested theory (more on this later) that work against Americans there is easier and more rewarding. Many of the KGB's American specialists have served tours in the United States, speak English fluently, are familiar with many aspects of official and private American life, and concentrate their operational efforts on the American target wherever they are stationed.

b. While the KGB as the larger and senior Soviet service, plays the major role in operations discussed in this paper, the GRU (actually the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense) works actively and with equal professionalism to collect strategic military intelligence abroad and is therefore primarily pitted against American military personnel and installations. It is also engaged in operations against American scientific and technical personnel in the West, particularly where the field of specialization has a military appli-

FIGURE 1. KGB MOSCOW HEADQUARTERS, KNOWN AS "THE CENTER"

cation. However, the GRU lacks exclusive domain, even in military intelligence, and considerable overlapping and even rivalry with the KGB is common.

Overseas Deployment of KGB and GRU

Few Americans abroad in diplomatic, military or other official and private capacities fully appreciate the overwhelming overseas deployment of Soviet Intelligence which can and is being brought to bear against them as well as against non-American targets. The fact is that about 60% of the approximately 7,000 Soviets abroad in official installations are intelligence officers of the two services in a ratio of roughly two to one in favor of the KGB. Among Soviets with diplomatic rank the percentage of intelligence officers is even higher; the world-wide average is about 75% and in some countries it tops 90%. These statistics are based on identifications made by Soviet intelligence officers who have defected to the West and are in a position to point out their former colleagues and on analyses by Western security and counterintelligence services, including American, which have been able to detect and observe the Soviets in operational intelligence activity.

Intelligence units (known as legal residencies) of both KGB and GRU exist independently of each other in Soviet missions abroad, and staff personnel of both services are protected by diplomatic immunity or have other official status. The operations chief of each residency (referred to as the resident) normally has a senior cover position. In the case of the KGB, the resident may be counselor of embassy or at a minimum a first secretary. Since 1961 the GRU resident has been divorced from the too-obvious role of military attache and now has no visible military affiliation. Typically, he may be a first secretary of embassy, or, perhaps, deputy chief of the Soviet commercial representation.

Operational intelligence officers of KGB and GRU residencies abroad are widely dispersed throughout all components and levels of the official Soviet mission. They have cover—and function on a part-time basis—as diplomatic secretaries of all grades, as political and cultural and scientific attaches, as consuls, vice-consuls, press and information officers, foreign trade representatives and, as indicated, in almost every country they far outnumber the legitimate diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and non-intelligence representatives of other Soviet ministries or organizations. In some offices, intelligence personnel may have a complete monopoly. Certain consular offices, for example, have been wholly staffed by the KGB. And it is by now a well-verified fact that all personnel of Soviet military attache offices, including low-ranking ostensible civilian employees, are actually professional military officers and career members of the GRU. This situation frequently gives rise to some curious evolutions in cover and rank. To illustrate, Pavel Ivanovich Lomakin, a civilian chauffeur of the military attache office in Rome from 1954 to 1960, next appeared in Cyprus in 1964 as a full-fledged Lt. Colonel with the title of assistant military attache. Similarly, Robespier N. Filatov, a lowly civilian driver/interpreter for the military attache in Ottawa from 1957 to 1960, was posted to Rio de Janeiro in 1963 with diplomatic rank as second secretary. Filatov, it is known, was actually a lieutenant senior grade of the Soviet army while in Canada; Lomakin was probably a major while in Rome.

FIGURE 2. GRU OFFICERS LOMAKIN (LEFT) AND FILATOV

The overseas deployment of Soviet intelligence officers, whether located within or outside official installations, comes reasonably close to saturating the available accredited cover positions. The majority of Soviet news media personnel abroad are intelligence officers. Overall, more than 60% have been so identified and this is considered a minimal figure. Included in this category are correspondents for the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia and representatives of the TASS and Novosti news agencies. Aeroflot, the world-wide and still expanding Soviet civilian airline, provides both cover and support to Soviet Intelligence, particularly the GRU, and surveys in recent years have established that 70% of its overseas representatives are staff officers of that service.

From numerous publicized espionage cases in the United States, Americans have become generally aware that the United Nations in New York, including the internationally staffed Secretariat and the permanent Soviet U. N. Mission, is used as a cover base by the Soviet intelligence services. The same is true of U. N. offices and specialized subsidiary organizations in Europe. One example is the Paris headquarters of the U.N. Economic and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) where over 60 Soviets are employed in the Secretariat or attached to the Soviet UNESCO Mission. Approximately 25% are identified or suspect intelligence officers and the true percentage is believed to be much higher. Another example is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with headquarters in Vienna. Out of 55 Soviets working in the multinational IAEA Secretariat as technical experts, translators, etc., or attached to the permanent Soviet IAEA Mission, nearly half are identified or strongly suspect intelligence officers with the margin of error believed to be on the conservative side. The picture is much the same in Geneva with a high concentration of KGB and GRU officers in the U.N. European Office (EOUN), the permanent Soviet Mission to EOUN, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and others.

The KGB and East European Bloc Services Abroad

At several points there will be a reference to instances in which agents or personnel of one of the intelligence services of the East European Communist Bloc have given support in the West to a Soviet Intelligence operation against an American. This is an outgrowth of the close working relationship which is known to exist between the KGB and the civilian East European Communist services which share the Soviet concept of the United States as the "main enemy." (For purposes of this paper, these are the services of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and to a limited degree, Rumania.) Laszlo Szabo, a senior intelligence officer who defected from the Hungarian AVH, referred to this collaboration in the following terms in testimony before a committee of the House of Representatives of the Eighty-ninth Congress:

> "Periodically, the Soviets call conferences with the Bloc services in the USSR for discussion of intelligence objectives and problems. The work between Soviet and Bloc intelligence and security services is a direct result of the cooperation between the national Communist parties and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. . . . Each Bloc service has agreed with the Soviet service to achieve certain broad objectives in its own interest and in the interests of other Bloc services. The United States is considered to be the main enemy."

The periodic conferences mentioned by Szabo take place annually and the inter-service agreements made are followed up with day-to-day coordination and guidance by a small group of KGB officers assigned to the headquarters of each counterpart Bloc service. Although much of the emphasis is on operations against American and other Western personnel and installations within the Bloc area (a subject outside the scope of this paper), there is evidence that the Bloc services, where they are represented abroad in the West, cooperate closely with the KGB, occasionally to the extent of making their own personnel and local agents available to the latter.

In the field of military intelligence operations, particularly those involving American military personnel and installations connected with NATO, relationships are also close between the GRU and the East European military intelligence services. Inter-service agreements on intelligence requirements are reached at annual meetings of the Warsaw Pact powers. There is evidence that the GRU and the Bloc military intelligence services regularly share views, experiences, technical knowledge and operational tasks not only at the headquarters level within

the Bloc area but also in the West through collaborative relationships between residencies through their respective military attaches.

In summary, this introduction has sought to identify the existence and steady intensification of the Soviet Intelligence threat to Americans and U.S. installations abroad and briefly to describe the Soviet components involved and the variety of cover positions from which they operate on a truly massive scale. The sections which follow will be primarily concerned with the goals of Soviet Intelligence operations against Americans abroad, the target categories of highest priority (and their vulnerabilities), the Soviet approach to these targets frontally and indirectly and, by illustration, Soviet techniques both crude and subtle which, as we will see, frequently fail but too often have succeeded with serious security damage to the United States.

II. THE GOALS AND AMERICAN TARGETS ABROAD OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE

"The directive [by KGB headquarters] stresses the need to recruit agents who can provide us with official documents from American installations. Priority . . . is given to agents with access to encrypted and other secret correspondence, such as code clerks, cipher machine technicians, file clerks and secretaries. . . . It instructs our officers to be more aggressive in developing personal contacts and confidential relationships with Americans abroad who can obtain work either within U.S. overseas installations or with U.S. Government and scientific organizations in the United States. Similar confidential relationships are also desired with Americans abroad who work in American establishments in any capacity, such as translators, drivers or even domestics . . . such agent networks should be used to obtain a complete picture of the staffing and work schedules within American installations in order to obtain secret documents and to emplace audio surveillance devices."

Goals

The primary goals of Soviet Intelligence operations against Americans abroad are to obtain cryptographic materials so as to be able to read enciphered communications, and to acquire, preferably in documentary form, official secrets through recruitment of Americans—civilian and military and of all grades—who themselves have access to the classified information.

There are, of course, other objectives: to collect American scientific and technological information in virtually every field, industrial as well as military, overt as well as classified; to work toward ultimate penetration and manipulation of American political and public life through identification and assessment of Americans with the potential to be political action agents and, in addition, to cultivate various categories of non-official Americans abroad, such as students, who can be brought under control and persuaded to seek jobs eventually with U.S. Government agencies, including the intelligence and security services. All of these, however, are secondary to the basic goal of getting secret information from American overseas installations by every possible means.

Target Categories

While the KGB would not overlook any promising American target—an ambassador, career Foreign Service officer, or any other senior U.S. official abroad—it is clear from Soviet Intelligence doctrine and from scores of reported and often observed KGB and GRU developmental operations and recruitment approaches that the most aggressive Soviet operational activity is directed against junior employees of American diplomatic and other official establishments and against enlisted overseas personnel of the military services. It is this broad category of code clerks, secretaries, Marine guards, etc., which the Soviets regard as particularly vulnerable since (in the words of one KGB directive) "they do not belong to the privileged class and are worse off financially."

Code and Communications Personnel

In 1961, a general directive sent to KGB residencies abroad, signed by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin, then Chairman of the KGB, emphasized forcefully that the first priority task of every residency was "to recruit cipher clerks." It noted tersely that "the most fruitful results" were obtained in this manner. KGB residencies were instructed to concentrate on "the identification of American code clerks in preparation for approaching and recruiting them." It is known that at least one KGB residency in the West received follow-up support from Moscow headquarters on the heels of the Shelepin directive. This was in the form of a prepared list

of code clerks, complete with names and biographical data, who were at that time assigned to the Western country and against whom residency efforts were to be concentrated.

The majority of code clerks and other American communications personnel abroad tend to fall in the "junior employee" category in terms of grade and salary. For the most part, they are relatively young, often unattached (both male and female), often less politically sophisticated than senior personnel, and tend to spend their off-duty social time in company with each other and with other junior employees. Unlike their Soviet counterparts abroad, who are required to live within Soviet official installations and are not allowed on the streets without a protective escort, American embassy code clerks live where they please and are free to circulate socially, to associate with local citizens and non-official Americans at their foreign posts. Under these conditions their specialized and sensitive occupations tend to become widely known and, in fact, it is relatively easy for an aggressive and capable Soviet intelligence residency, especially one which makes effective use of a local agent network, to identify them and develop means of direct or indirect access for assessment purposes and, in some cases, for recruitment attempts.

The Soviet effort against code clerks takes almost every imaginable form, ranging from the wildly crude to subtle, well-planned and highly complex operations in which the Soviet hand is concealed until the last moment and the intended victim is caught completely by surprise.

An example of Soviet crudity in particularly blatant form occurred in 1966 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Vladimir T. Putyatov, Soviet second secretary and CRU officer known to specialize in operations against communications personnel, approached an American Embassy code clerk who was entertaining an embassy secretary at a beach resort restaurant. An assiduous cultivator of Americans, Putyatov had met the code clerk socially a few weeks before and unquestionably was aware of his occupation. The Soviet invited himself to dinner with the American couple, proceeded to get drunk, then offered to make both of the Americans rich if they would give him embassy documents for which he would pay in American dollars. He kept insisting the code clerk meet him privately. More annoyed than alarmed by Putyatov's persistence, the Americans, even with pointed insults, were not able to make the GRU officer leave them alone. They were finally rescued by another Soviet (a known KGB officer) who came over to the table and led his staggering colleague away. Putyatov, however, remained persistent even when sober. A few weeks later he showed up uninvited at a dinner party given by an AID employee for several Americans, including the same code clerk. This time, and without drinking, Putyatov again concentrated his attention on the code clerk. The latter, however had been keeping the embassy security office informed of Putyatov's aggressive actions and the Soviet finally abandoned his efforts.

Not infrequently, an indirect method involving use of local (non-Soviet) agents and compromise of the target individual through sexual involvement is a favorite Soviet first step. A few years ago in a North African country, a Soviet intelligence officer told one of his agents, a European businessman and local resident, that his principal objective was to penetrate the American Embassy communications section. He planned to achieve this by sexual compromise of a female embassy clerk whom he identified to the agent. The latter, at that time only slightly acquainted with the American girl, was ordered to seduce her and was promised a large financial reward if successful. In this case, he was not. Similarly, in a Near Eastern country, a local government official who had been recruited as an agent by the Soviets, was instructed to meet and cultivate two American girls who were close friends—one of them an embassy code clerk, the other a CIA employee. The Soviet officer described both girls as attractive, single, and "second class citizens." In telling the agent to become sexually involved with either one of the girls, the Soviet officer displayed a diamond ring which he promised would be available for presentation as a gift if the agent was able to carry out his assignment.

Once having set its sights on a code or communications target believed even remotely susceptible on a long-range basis to Soviet inducements or threats, the KGB is both relentless and patient. One Department of State communications technician who, although American by birth, had an East European ethnic and educational background and once served in a very junior capacity in an American diplomatic mission in the USSR during World War

ll, has since been the object of two developmental approaches in different parts of the world, followed by a subsequent recruitment attempt at a third foreign post. In this particular case, the KGB contrived an "accidental" encounter in the Far East with a Soviet citizen (coached by the KGB for the purpose if not a regular staff officer) whom the American had last known and last seen 16 years earlier as a young and friendly electrician/handyman in the USSR. This time the Soviet posed as an affluent civilian TV factory director from Leningrad, temporarily in the Far East on business. (Actually, travel records showed the Soviet was present in the area with a diplomatic passport on temporary duty from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) The second Soviet approach, this time in Europe, came two years later and involved a KGB American operations specialist under diplomatic cover who presented himself to the American bearing greetings and a letter from the original Soviet friend. The new Soviet attempted to follow up the first approach with renewed efforts at cultivation and rapport. A third—and crucial—approach took place three years later in a different West European country. The American unsuspectingly met and made friends with a person who passed himself off as a naturalized South American businessman of the same East European origin as the American himself. The two were in occasional friendly contact for approximately eight months before anything happened. When the completely unexpected recruitment proposal was made—and reported—it was ostensibly on behalf of the foreign intelligence service of the East European country which wanted information on "all types of American cryptographic equipment," in return for which the startled American was offered financial security for the rest of his life. The circumstances of the unsuccessful recruitment bid indicated strongly that the ostensible naturalized South American was actually a Soviet "Illegal," i.e., a Soviet intelligence officer living and working in the West camouflaged and documented with a false, non-Soviet nationality.

The following case, although not new and given brief mention in the press at the time, is recounted here in fuller detail than before. Although there are some inexplicable aspects which are not likely ever to be resolved, the Soviet attempt to recruit code clerk Donald Ultan is a classic example of a well-planned, devious operation in which the Soviet hand was, in fact, completely concealed until the last moment.

Donald Ultan, age 30, Brooklyn-born employee of the American Embassy in Vienna, graduate of the University of California, applicant for career status in the Foreign Service and accustomed to European life from previous residence in Paris, was of special interest to Soviet Intelligence for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, he was a code clerk and thus automatically in the top priority category for recruitment. Secondly, his father was an emigre from Czarist Russia to the United States, and although the son had been brought up to speak only English at home, from the somewhat myopic viewpoint of Soviet Intelligence there was a bare chance that he might harbor some elements of sympathy for the homeland of his father. Thirdly, he was Jewish with apparently strong feelings about Nazi persecutions and an interest in the Resistance movements of World War II. And, finally, he was fluent in French, liked to converse in it, and was interested in languages in general. All of these factors, plus undoubtedly others, had come to Soviet attention in Vienna through their excellent local capability to monitor closely the job status, personal characteristics and social patterns of the young American group in Vienna, including embassy code clerks and secretaries, graduate students at the University of Vienna and some expatriate types with vague means of support. Interwoven with this group were others of various nationalities, including Austrian employees of the American Embassy. Although this group was by no means a single, clubby unit in the relaxed charm of Vienna's coffee house, concert and cocktail party circuit, the Soviets had within it an agent, exclusively directed against the Americans in the group, who had long since spotted Ultan, knew him and his friends, shared some of their social life and was willing and able to assist the KGB in mounting a somewhat bizarre operation against the code clerk.

The sidewalk cafe of the old and famous Sacher Hotel, a pleasant spot for an aperitif in May 1958, was the opening scene. The agent of the Soviets, a naturalized citizen of a friendly Western country and a brilliant mathematician, had invited an unemployed American teacher, a close friend of Ultan and, like him, a fluent French-speaker, to join him for a drink. The plan was quite simple; merely to bring about a "chance" meeting between the

teacher and a stranger sitting at an adjoining table. This was a medium-sized, slightly-balding individual of about 40, who wore tinted spectacles, dressed conservatively but well, spoke French, and who presented himself as Josef Beck, a semi-retired Belgian businessman who professed to be somewhat lonely and to be having trouble with the German-language menu. It was not difficult to engineer the meeting, and the mathematician/agent then excused himself and departed, confident that the American teacher would hospitably invite Beck to accompany him to a dinner engagement with Ultan in a nearby restaurant. This is precisely what happened.

FIGURE 3. VIENNA SIDEWALK CAFE
The false "Monsieur Beck" had trouble with the menu

One interesting facet of this Soviet operation is that Beck, neither initially nor later, ever appeared to fix his sights directly on Ultan, although the code clerk was in fact his target. After the first dinner meeting, Beck arranged for another social get-together with the American teacher rather than Ultan. He knew well, however, that whenever he was with the teacher he would almost certainly encounter Ultan. And so it was throughout the month of May and into June, a pattern of regular encounters in cafes and coffee houses patronized by the multi-national group of which Ultan was a part. There were long hours of conversation, always in French (Beck spoke it with a Slavic accent which he attributed to a Bessarabian origin), evenings of quiet chess-playing and an occasional outing to one of the quaint wine houses on the edge of the Vienna woods. Claiming to be Jewish, Beck said he was in Vienna to look for a house for a sister in Israel who wanted to move to Austria. He also spoke of a brother in Tel Aviv. He never disclosed where he was staying in Vienna and apparently no one bothered to press him on the point. After a social evening, he would merely ask to be dropped off on a street corner in a particular part of the city. Beck also gave no address in Belgium, even when once asked, but left the impression he was from somewhere near Brussels. His alleged business speciality was textiles, but there seems to have been little or no discussion of this. What bound him to Ultan's circle was a professed interest in the very things Ultan enjoyed—conversation in French, the subject of language in general, discussion of Jewish persecutions and wartime Resistance movements. Beck said he had been a member of the Belgian underground and was writing a book on the subject. In view of what happened later, it is both interesting and surprising that Beck apparently made no effort to pump Ultan or even see him alone. The lack of deep personal intimacy can be illustrated by the fact that Ultan, as well as the others in the group, always addressed their new friend as "Monsieur Beck", feeling that use of his first name would perhaps be too familiar.

Sometime prior to 12 June and after hosting a small dinner party for Ultan plus the American teacher and an American psychology student and his wife, Beck dropped out of sight, apparently having left Vienna without saying where he was going. It was assumed that he had returned to Belgium, but nobody really was sure.

Almost five months later—on 1 November to be precise—and at a time when Ultan's parents were visiting Vienna, Beck suddenly appeared at Ultan's bachelor apartment. He came unannounced, bearing a bottle of whiskey as a gift. He seemed to be nervous and after a minimum of small talk, which did not include an explanation of his absence from Vienna, came quickly to the point. He said he was a Soviet agent and could offer Ultan an opportunity to make a lot of money. "We don't want much," he told the code clerk, "only what you know from your job." The flabbergasted Ultan, still thinking he was dealing with a Belgian, rejected the offer. Beck started to argue, stressing that they were both Jewish, referring to an alleged recent

"progress" somewhere in France (it is not clear what this was) but particularly emphasizing that by providing the Soviets with secret information on a one-time basis, Ultan could score a "coup" and need not be further involved. At this juncture there was an unexpected interruption. Ultan's friend, the American teacher, dropped by for a visit, as he frequently did, and conversation reverted to normal in his presence. Ultimately, Ultan left the apartment to get some beer for all of them and Beck followed him to the street. There on the sidewalk the discussion began again, with Beck repeatedly offering money to Ultan. "How much?", asked the code clerk, apparently more out of curiosity than anything else. "You name it." was the reply. Beck asked if Ultan would agree to meet him once more to talk over the matter. When Ultan acquiesced, Beck pulled out a slip of paper on which a street meeting place away from the heart of the city was already written down; they agreed the time would be at 3 P.M. on 5 November. At this point and still perhaps not fully grasping the import of what was happening, Ultan solicitously asked Beck if he had been coerced by the Soviets into working for them. The reply was a clincher. He was not coerced, said Beck, nor was he a Belgian. "I am a Soviet citizen with a Soviet passport." He turned down the street and disappeared.

The stunned Ultan reentered his apartment and told the American teacher what had happened. The advice given him was to report the whole affair immediately to the embassy security officer. Ultan agreed but mistakenly felt his first responsibility was to get his parents, particularly his Russian-born father, out of the city on some sort of pretext. Apparently he feared for their safety. This took several days to arrange and on 4 November Ultan was in touch with the security officer.

In an effort to establish the true identity of Beck, arrangements were made with Austrian authorities to apprehend him at the scheduled meeting the following day. Security plainclothesmen were staked out around the meeting site and closed in when the two men met. However, when identification was demanded, Beck established his immunity from arrest by producing a Soviet diplomatic passport issued in Moscow on 18 March 1958 in the name of Mikhail Shchukin, Third Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Austrians had no choice but to release him. He departed for Moscow by air the next day.

Austrian authorities were able to reconstruct that Shchukin (probably a false name) first arrived in Vienna from Moscow on 28 March 1958 on assignment to the permanent Soviet Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency, a subordinate body to the United Nations with headquarters in Vienna. This was approximately five weeks before he was inserted as Josef Beck into the circle around Ultan. On 12 June, it was established, Shchukin flew back to Moscow and did not return to Vienna until 24 October. From this pattern it is evident that he was not actually stationed in Austria on a permanent duty tour basis. Unquestionably a KGB staff officer (and probably not Jewish, as claimed, since Jews are a rarity in the Soviet intelligence services), it would appear that he came to Vienna under diplomatic cover, on temporary duty, solely for the purpose of developing and carrying through the Ultan operation. He went back to Moscow KGB headquarters in June when he apparently felt he had completed the development phase and returned to Vienna in late October for the final step—the unsuccessful recruitment attempt. The uncharacteristic five-month gap between the relatively brief, indirect and almost detached cultivation of the American code clerk and the abortive attempt to recruit him is difficult to explain. The delay could have been a measure to protect the original, non-Soviet spotter/agent, who had been negotiating for a professional job in another Western country. This agent left Austria, in fact, just before the attempt to recruit Ultan. On the other hand, the delay could have been due to other factors such as KGB internal debate as to whether Ultan was, in fact, reasonably susceptible to a recruitment bid.

Military Personnel

> "The KGB directive [of 1959] specifies a need for more recruited agents—both Americans and local citizens—who work at . . . U.S. military bases and other strategic targets."

It has already been noted earlier in this paper that although the GRU is operationally active against American military personnel and installations abroad, the KGB also pursues military targets and, in fact, is directed to do so as illustrated by the above quotation from a KGB document.

The files of U.S. security services are replete with instances of both direct and indirect Soviet probing of American military personnel in every quarter of the world. This is true of enlisted men detailed to military, naval and air attache offices abroad who, generally speaking, have much the same social mobility in their local environment as junior civilian personnel of other sections of the diplomatic installations concerned. It is also true anywhere there are American military personnel overseas—in West Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Libya, Thailand, Japan, etc.

Regardless of location, the Soviet objective is the same—spotting and development of character weaknesses and personal vulnerabilities which will facilitate recruitment and subsequent control, preferably control which can be maintained over the long term and after the recruited agent is rotated back to duty in the United States.

In a 1966 study titled "Motivations to Treason," the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Army made a systematic comparison of factors which, since World War II, have led U.S. military personnel to engage in espionage or defect to the USSR or Communist Bloc states. Interestingly, found no evidence in any espionage case studied of an Army serviceman having been recruited on the basis of foreign birth, ideological preference for communism or threats based on the presence of relatives in communist controlled areas. It did find, however, that military personnel who are maladjusted and have "gone sour" are the ones most susceptible to Soviet and other hostile recruitment. Present in some degree as common denominators in virtually all cases of both espionage and defection have been factors of sex, liquor, marital problems, personal immaturity and debt. The greatest single inducement to recruitment for espionage has been greed for money.

To a remarkable degree these findings coincide with Soviet Intelligence doctrine. One Soviet official document put it this way: "In developing recruitment candidates, the KGB urges skillful exploitation of financial insecurity, material needs, weakness for liquor, gambling and other personal vulnerability factors."

Army Sgt. Robert L. Johnson, arrested by the FBI in 1965 and currently serving a 25-year prison sentence for espionage, is a prime example of a soldier who "went sour," sought to defect to the Soviets, and instead wound up serving them as a recruited agent in both Europe and the United States over a span of more than a decade. During this period he received, by his own estimate, approximately $25,000 and, from the Soviet standpoint, it was money well spent.

The product of a broken home and a high school dropout, Johnson was a veteran of some 10 years Army service who had accumulated a variety of personal and career problems by early 1953, at which time he was stationed with an infantry unit in West Berlin. He was supporting an Austrian-born mistress, with a background of immorality and mental instability, and an illegitimate child. All efforts at permission to marry had so far been unsuccessful and his hopes were not high. In his unit assignments he had suffered a series of real or imagined set-backs which he blamed on his superiors. He finally came to the point where, in his own words, "I did not want to have anything further to do with the Army or the American way of life . . . with all these things on my mind, I decided to seek asylum with the Soviets." The attempt was made in East Berlin, but Johnson was rather easily persuaded to remain in place as an agent of Soviet Intelligence. Shortly thereafter he received permission to marry and obtained a transfer to the Berlin Command G-2 Section (Intelligence) as a clerk in charge of files. In this new job he systematically began to photograph classified documents with a miniature camera and used his wife as a courier to pass the film to the Soviets. During this period, and for cash payments, Johnson recruited—and subsequently introduced to Soviet Intelligence—James Allen Mintkenbaugh, also a file clerk in the G-2 Section, to assist him in his espionage work. (During the ensuing years Johnson and Mintkenbaugh worked both together and separately for the Soviets, even after 1956 when Mintkenbaugh returned to the States for discharge. Mintkenbaugh was arrested at the same time as Johnson and also received a 25-year prison sentence.)

Although all of Johnson's work for the Soviets was of value to them, the highlight of his espionage career came during an assignment to the Armed Forces Courier Transfer Station at Orly Field, near Paris—a transfer point for sealed courier mail, much

FIGURE 4. COLLEAGUES IN ESPIONAGE: FORMER ARMY SGTS. JOHNSON (LEFT) AND MINTKENBAUGH

Personal problems and the lure of Soviet money led to treason in Europe and the U.S.

of a highly classified, between the military services in Europe and the United States. The courier service is also utilized by other U.S. Government components. Beginning in May 1961, Johnson assessed and reported about courier service personnel to the Soviets (thereby providing them a number of potential recruitment prospects) and photographed and described the Courier Station itself. All of this was preliminary to the real Soviet objective—a surreptitious penetration of the Courier Station vault for access to classified pouch envelopes. To achieve this, Johnson volunteered for permanent weekend duty at the Station during which time he would be alone at night and with physical access to the exterior of the vault. By making use of wax impressions of the key used to open the padlock and by using a Soviet-supplied radioactive device to X-ray the combination lock and read the combination, Johnson gained unauthorized access to the vault itself in November 1962 and began to supply Soviet Intelligence with pouch envelopes. On each occasion he removed up to 15 envelopes classified up to Top Secret from the vault, left his post briefly and passed them under cover of darkness to his Soviet contact who waited a short distance away. The envelopes were returned to Johnson within a few hours, after the Soviets had opened them, photographed the contents, and then resealed them. KGB document specialists were sent to Paris from Moscow to process the valuable material supplied by Johnson, including the delicate job of opening and resealing the envelopes. In the late spring of 1963 the Soviets suspended the vault operation for security reasons but planned to resume and expand it when the nights grew longer later in the year. Johnson, however, was transferred from Orly before that time.

The following case involving recruitment overseas of an enlisted man is covered in some detail as a striking example of thorough advance spotting and assessment by Soviet Intelligence, of exploitation of character weakness and greed for money, and use of the technique of threat of exposure based on compromising information.

The first American negro ever convicted of espionage is Nelson C. Drummond, former Yeoman 1st Class, U.S. Navy, who received a life sentence in 1963 for betraying his country in return for Soviet payments totalling about $24,000 over a five-year

period. Although his sordid career came to an end late one night in September 1962 in the parking lot of a diner at Larchmont, New York, when the FBI, which had been on his trail for some time, arrested him in the act of passing classified naval documents to a GRU staff officer camouflaged as a diplomat, the start of his downhill slide into espionage and ultimate degradation actually began 3,000 miles away—in London, England.

Drummond, in the late autumn of 1957, was a 28-year-old administrative clerk in the Grosvenor Square headquarters of the U.S. naval command for England, Atlantic and the Mediterranean (known at the time as CINCNELM). His Top Secret and COSMIC (NATO) security clearances gave him daily access to highly classified American and NATO naval documents. But despite the trusted position, the stocky and partly bald sailor with a neat mustache was as full of character flaws and vulnerabilities as a man could be.

For one thing, Drummond was a gambler with chronic financial problems which led him to borrow money from anyone who would lend it. His debts piled up. He was involved in black-market selling of liquor and cigarettes from the Navy Exchange store. There were expenses to be met, the costs of London pub-crawling and evenings of heavy drinking at a seamy nightspot called the Sunset Club. It was here he met a prostitute/waitress with an illegitimate child. She lived with him, without working at either of her professions, for nearly a year in several cheap apartments. He finally kicked her out in favor of an unbroken series of back-street pickups, some of whom he treated brutally, and none of whom stayed with him for more than a few days at a time.

Drummond was altogether an unsavory character with a reputation as such at his off-duty haunts. The Soviets, through the eyes and ears of the spotter agents they always maintain in large foreign cities, became fully aware of the man, his job, his weaknesses and his daily routine. The rest proved quite easy.

One evening when Drummond, dressed as usual in civilian clothes, was homeward bound on Bayswater Road from office to subway he was approached on the street by a friendly stranger who struck up a casual conversation leading quickly to adjournment to a nearby pub. For over an hour the stranger bought Drummond's drinks—shots of whiskey at the equivalent of a dollar a shot. The sailor readily agreed to the suggestion they have a few together the next night at the same place. The second time was a more extended drinking spree, lasting some five hours, and again the stranger paid the check. Drummond, by one account after his arrest five years later, said he thought his benefactor was an Englishman. He later admitted detecting an accent but said he thought nothing of it because of the many foreigners and foreign accents encountered in London. In any event, he had no suspicion his new friend was Soviet, asked no questions—not even the man's name—and in somewhat befuddled state responded favorably when asked if he would like to earn 250 pounds by illegally obtaining a Navy ID card so that friends of the stranger could have access to the Navy Exchange. He accepted the money in advance and unhesitantly signed the receipt which the stranger said he needed "to show the boys" where the money had gone.

A week or 10 days later when the stranger showed up at the same pub, Drummond could not produce the ID card. In fact, he had no means of obtaining one. He was promised a little more time. At a fourth meeting, when the sailor still could not produce, the action stepped up. The stranger told Drummond he had better come with him, and the two men walked a few blocks to what the sailor at first thought was a private mansion. They walked up a driveway and into a side entrance. In a room at the rear of the first floor the stranger had Drummond sit down, introduced himself (not by name) as a colonel in the Soviet Army, produced the original receipt for 250 pounds which had been altered to include wording that the signer agreed to furnish documents as well as an ID card, and told Drummond he would turn it over to the authorities and also expose him for black market activities if he failed to produce classified information from his job at CINCNELM. The thoroughly cowed sailor agreed, accepted and receipted for another 50 pound payment, was escorted out the side door and placed in a waiting car which took him out the other end of the driveway to another street, then drove him around for a time at random and finally deposited him on a street corner.

Twice in the next few weeks a chauffeur-driven car pulled alongside Drummond as he walked along Bayswater Street and a new Soviet demanded the promised documents from CINCNELM. Drum-

mond's failure to produce led to another confrontation with the colonel in what the American now realized was the Soviet Embassy. The threats were more forceful this time, another payment was made and a new receipt signed which specifically included the promise to supply classified information from the American headquarters in Grosvenor Square. At this point (possibly sooner, because Drummond's later confession cannot be considered wholly reliable) the regular passage of sensitive material began.

The technique was always the same. He would be picked up on designated days by two Soviets in a car which would pull up alongside him on Bayswater Street. He would pass documents to the Soviet in the rear seat and the latter would shortly thereafter be dropped off on a street corner and disappear. The chauffeur (Drummond said he never spoke) would then drive aimlessly through London with the sailor as his passenger, returning eventually to pick up the other Soviet who would hand back the documents which by then, of course, had been photographed. Drummond would return them undetected to CINCNELM files.

There were two more Soviet Embassy meetings with the colonel. At the first, Drummond signed a receipt for $300 which included a listing of the precise documents he had furnished. At the second, which came sometime after March 1958 and shortly after Drummond had been transferred to a non-sensitive job which deprived him of access to classified information, the colonel warned Drummond he was under investigation for matters unrelated to his work for the Soviets and contact would therefore be broken temporarily as a precautionary measure. The payment this time was $500. (The Soviet warning is interesting since it was correct that Drummond at this time was one of several in his work area under Office of Naval Intelligence investigation in connection with some missing documents; this had been the reason for his transfer to a new job. The Soviets apparently had inside information from other sources. Drummond was later cleared of suspicion. According to Drummond, the documents which could not be located were not documents he had given the Soviets.)

The exact chronology is uncertain, but prior to Drummond's transfer to the United States in May 1958 he received Soviet instructions for reestablishment of contact with the GRU in New York. According to his own version, the instructions were given him in writing by an unidentified man who approached him in a restroom in Southampton, England, shortly before he boarded ship. He also received a single cuff link with a horsehead design which he was to wear in his lapel as an identification sign at the place of recontact which was designated in Harlem. The Soviet meeting him would wear a similar cuff link in his lapel, and the instructions also called for a recognition phrase and countersign.

So much for the recruitment and use of this American abroad and the way in which he was led to continued espionage for the Soviets in the United States. The New York recontact was made on schedule and for the next four years Drummond, during the course of duty tours at Boston, Norfolk and finally at the U.S. Naval Base, Newport, Rhode Island, had between 30 and 40 clandestine meetings with three successive Soviet intelligence officers, all of them known to him only as "Mike," and all of them accredited diplomatic representatives to the Soviet U.N. Mission in New York. Meetings were chiefly held in the New York area, and Drummond passed over quantities of classified documents, the most important of them from files of the Mobile Electronic Technical Unit at the Newport Base, on naval radar equipment, electronic countermeasures data, weapons control systems, etc. Soon after Drummond's arrest it was estimated that the dollar cost of revising and reissuing compromised naval manuals and publications in these fields alone might be well over $200,000,000.

Two GRU officers were expelled from the United States as a result of the arrests made at the Larchmont diner in September 1962. One was "Mike #3," actually Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich Prokhorov, second secretary of the Soviet U.N. Mission. The other was a colleague loitering in the immediate vicinity as a counter-surveillant, Ivan Yakovlevich Vyrodov, who had diplomatic status as a third secretary. Drummond's first two handling officers in America, both of whom had already left the country on routine change of assignment, were identified as Mikhail Stepanovich Savelev, a first secretary at the Soviet U.N. Mission until September 1961, and another third secretary, Vadim Vladimirovich Sorokin, who had departed the United States in May 1962. These were "Mike #1" and "Mike #2," both GRU staff officers.

Marine Guards

U.S. Marine enlisted men, assigned as guards at diplomatic installations abroad, are especially interesting targets to Soviet Intelligence because of their frequent access to safe combinations, their presence (sometimes alone) in embassies while on night duty and their obvious capability—in the event of recruitment—to emplace microphone and transmitter listening devices.

Although handpicked for their protective duty assignments abroad and given special training and security indoctrination, Marine guard personnel are, for the most part, young and unmarried and often "on the town" in their off-duty hours. They are inevitably exposed to temptations which the Soviets can put in their paths. They are approachable by local nationals who are recruited agents of Soviet Intelligence and often by Soviets themselves. There have been repeated approaches of both types in every part of the world and also attempts at recruitment.

Soviet interest in Marine guards is often shown in requirements given to Soviet agents. For example, in the recently disclosed case of a KGB penetration of the American Embassy in Brussels (to be described in detail later in this section), the local employee agent was asked to describe the location of all Marine guard posts inside the embassy and to furnish details of guard shift schedules. In Vienna, an Austrian agent of the KGB who had normal access in his employment to American installations and personnel was told to cultivate persons of two categories within the embassy—local citizens working as switchboard operators and Marine guard personnel.

A few years ago, also in Vienna, a makeshift Marine guard volleyball team was challenged to play a local Soviet colony team. The first match was held on an impromptu basis near the Marine residence. The Soviets then followed up with an invitation for a second game to be played inside the Soviet residential compound—an unprecedented gesture which clearly was intended to give the Vienna KGB American-operations specialists a chance to cultivate Marines socially and open the way for possible further contact, assessment and development. To make it a festive occasion, virtually the entire Soviet colony turned out in force, complete with wives and children, and the game was preceded by a film showing and followed by drinks and other refreshments. KGB officers, particularly those identified with American operations, circulated among the Marine guard guests and other Americans present, chatting, asking questions and in the process sizing up potential prospects. A Soviet photographer moved busily around taking pictures of Americans. Subsequently, there were several KGB attempts to follow up the initial contacts made on this occasion, notably at a local bowling alley frequented by Marines and other Americans. The Soviet intelligence officers would drop in uninvited, ask to be shown how to bowl, offer to buy drinks and extend invitations for future social events.

In Cyprus a few years ago, Marine personnel frequented a local bar whose owner was subsequently determined to be a member of the illegal Cypriot Communist Party and a spotter for Soviet Intelligence. He is known to have introduced a number of Marines to Soviet Intelligence officers stationed in Cyprus, one of them a GRU officer, Nikolay Ivanovich Ranov, who spoke fluent English and posed successfully as a European businessman at the time introductions were made. Ranov, in fact, had official cover as local representative of the Soviet airline, Aeroflot. The Cyprus Government expelled him for espionage in March 1967.

FIGURE 5. GRU OFFICER NIKOLAY I. RANOV
He posed as a European to cultivate Marines

A disarmingly simple Soviet attempt to open a relationship with an embassy Marine guard took place in Copenhagen. A KGB officer, Aleksandr Ivanovich Roganov, came to the American Embassy with a group of Soviet visa applicants, a routine visit in his official cover function as vice-consul. While waiting in the reception room, Roganov engaged the Marine guard on duty in casual conversation during which he elicited his name, rank, address and telephone number. Two days later he telephoned the Marine at the guard residence and invited him to a public performance to be held a few days later. The Marine properly reported the invitation, was told not to accept, and subsequently told Roganov not to bother him again.

In Djakarta, Indonesia, in 1962, KGB officer Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Losev made repeated efforts to cultivate—and in one instance tried to recruit—Marine guard personnel. It was his practice to walk in on Marines at the bar of a local hotel, buy their drinks, and follow them back to the Marine quarters for more socializing. He offered to take one guard on a weekend outing and provide him with female companionship. The climax came when he stopped another Marine on the streets of Djakarta and, after a long conversation, attempted to recruit him on the basis of large payments to provide information available to him as chief of the guard force, including identification of American intelligence personnel in Indonesia.

Secretaries and File Clerks

Female secretaries and file clerks in American diplomatic and other official installations abroad are considered worthwhile targets by the KGB because of their access to classified documents, especially cables, and because of their potential vulnerability to romantic involvement, either with Soviets themselves (as has sometimes been the case) or with non-Soviet nationals acting on behalf of the KGB.

A KGB officer in a West European country directed two of his local agents to develop information on the secretary of the American ambassador. He particularly wanted to know her residence address, the time she left the embassy each day and the route she normally took on the way home. How the KGB intended to exploit this information is not known in this case since the secretary was approaching the end of her tour and departed routinely within a matter of weeks.

In early 1967, a file clerk stationed in Egypt was unexpectedly visited by Viktor I. Volotskov, a Soviet third secretary and intelligence officer, whom she had never seen before. The explanation he gave for calling indicated Soviet spotting (and possibly accurate assessment) extending back five years earlier. In 1962, the American woman, at that time stationed in the Middle East, had taken a Black Sea cruise to Yalta. During the cruise she met a Soviet civilian with whom she was friendly. They exchanged addresses and wrote to each other sporadically for about a year. Her last communication to the Soviet in the USSR had been a Christmas card in 1963, at which time she was already at a new post in the same area. Four years later, when Volotskov approached her in Egypt, he gave her the thin and obviously contrived story that her Yalta cruise friend had recently been on a Soviet ship which docked briefly in Egypt and had asked Volotskov to look up the American clerk who he thought must be "somewhere in the Middle East." Volotskov managed to get in two animated social meetings with the American woman, during which he turned on considerable personal charm and said he wanted their relationship to continue. Fortunately, however, the American informed her superiors and the contact was brought to an end.

A variation of the above approach—similarly indicative of advance planning—occurred at a Far East post, also in 1967. A Soviet who identified himself as a visitor to a local trade fair telephoned an American secretary at the AID Mission. He said he would like to meet her to deliver a letter from a distant cousin in Latvia. The secretary agreed to the meeting and was given a letter and photo of her relative. Thoroughly disarmed and gullible as well, the secretary apparently succumbed to the Soviet's romantic advances in a series of further meetings. When it came time for the Soviet to leave the country, he introduced the secretary to a KGB officer under diplomatic cover, ostensibly so that the latter could serve as a channel for future correspondence. The situation finally became known to the embassy security officer and the secretary broke off the dangerous new relationship before it went any further.

On occasion, it has been necessary to transfer American secretarial or clerical personnel out of a

Foreign Service post where they have become entangled in a potentially compromising situation which, for one reason or another, they fail to recognize or assess realistically. For example, a secretary in a sensitive position in the American Embassy in an East African republic became involved in a love affair with a minor local official of Arab background who had once been employed by the embassy. She persisted in the affair despite repeated warnings, which she interpreted as bureaucratic attempts to restrict her social life. The primary security concern in this case was the fact that her lover, a playboy type who lived beyond his means, was known to have recently come into regular contact with a Soviet intelligence officer under diplomatic cover and with a particular interest in Americans. Although there was no reason to question the loyalty (if not the discretion) of the American secretary and also no evidence that her boyfriend had already begun to exploit her for information on behalf of the Soviets, a transfer was promptly arranged to frustrate the opening stages of a KGB operation directed at the embassy.

The case story which follows is lengthier than most but worthy of study. It has become a classic example of the entrapment of an American female abroad who was the target of a complex, skillfully executed KGB operation. It illustrates Soviet use of the technique of "false flag" (disguised nationality) development and close working collaboration between the KGB and a Communist Bloc service. It also illustrates in dramatic form the personal consequences of wishful thinking and blind faith when confronted with highly professional deception.

During the early morning hours of 11 June 1961, an attractive 31-year-old Foreign Service clerk, assigned to the restricted area files section of the American Embassy in West Germany, was undergoing the most terrifying ordeal of her life. She was a prisoner in a guarded house surrounded by a high wire fence in East Berlin. Behind her were hours of unnerving interrogation by East German intelligence agents, false accusations of espionage with convincing evidence spread out before her, the humiliation of a probing search which had spared no part of her body and the additional physical abuse of repeated slaps in the face. Facing her for the first time at 2 A. M. stood an unnamed Soviet in the uniform of a colonel who announced in fluent English that her own life and also the life of her fiance depended on her agreement to provide him with coded cables and other secret documents bearing on American policies and plans relating to Berlin and East Germany. Knowing that her fiance, whom she believed to be an American civilian working for a Western intelligence service, was at that moment in Soviet/East German hands in another part of the city, Eleanor (not her true name) saw no alternative to submission. She signed a statement agreeing to work for Soviet Intelligence in return for the colonel's promise to protect George Stein, her fiance. In a second confrontation with the colonel the following day, she was pressured into identifying and commenting on the personal characteristics of all her files section co-workers, the code room supervisor and the embassy communications officer. The colonel, she noted, appeared already familiar with the physical layout of the files section, location of the Top Secret vault and other details of the restricted area. Eleanor also accepted and receipted for funds given her to return to West Germany and agreed to bring classified documents to East Berlin for the next meeting which was arranged for 24 June. She was then released to take the first plane home from West Berlin.

Eleanor, fortunately, had no intention of serving as a Soviet penetration of the American Embassy despite frantic concern for the safety of the man she had promised to marry. Twenty minutes after returning to the apartment she shared with her elderly mother at the American housing community at Plittersdorf, near Bonn, and despite near emotional and physical collapse, she was telling the full story to the embassy security officer. Not until investigative proof was at hand could Eleanor accept the fact that ruggedly handsome George Stein, who had come into her life four months earlier, was not the American he pretended to be but rather an agent (either of the East German intelligence service or the KGB; true nationality unknown), working on behalf of the Soviets, whose sole mission was to entrap her into espionage against her own country.

It had begun in February at an informal American Embassy Club dance sponsored by the young "bachelor" group of the multi-national diplomatic community. Just how George Stein, ostensibly American tourist in Germany on holiday, maneuvered himself into this affair is not known. It could

have been through the cooperation of an established agent already within the group, or he could have simply walked in, mingled with the crowd, introduced himself to a stranger or two, then arranged to be presented by one of them to Eleanor. There is some evidence to support this latter view. It is not likely, however, that Stein gravitated to Eleanor on a haphazard basis. She was a relative newcomer to the Bonn embassy after earlier tours as a code clerk in Brussels and New Delhi. New Delhi is a post where the Soviets are known to have an elaborate spotting and assessment network directed against Americans. Since Eleanor had only a partial tour in New Delhi and had been transferred directly from India to Bonn for compassionate reasons (care of her mother), it can be theorized that a KGB operation against her was first conceived in India, then transferred to Germany for implementation when she moved to her new post.

The operational plan took time and care to mount. It was necessary to find an agent with actual living experience in America at some earlier stage in life, whose English would be idiomatic American and accent-free, to equip him with a false American passport (which Stein had), to coach him in a plausible life history and to establish him in the Bonn area. It is known now that the operational phase actually began in early January—a month before Stein actually met Eleanor—when he first registered in nearby Cologne. At the pension where he rented a room for some three months he posed successfully as an American. During the same period he registered twice at Cologne hotel, once as a German citizen (with appropriate documentation), the second time in his American identity.

Once having met Eleanor, Stein wasted no time. The first evening he requested permission to telephone for a date in the near future. The call came within two days. From then on it was a steady record of visits to the apartment, evenings at night clubs, cocktail parties and increasingly romantic involvement. Although often alone, they were also frequently with others in Eleanor's social group. During the intensive cultivation period from February through May, Eleanor introduced Stein to at least 10 of her American friends, all of them code clerks or files personnel at the embassy. They accepted him without question, just as she did.

Strongly attracted to the dark-haired and stocky 200-pounder, Eleanor was in no mood to question anything. (Within four weeks they were discussing marriage and shortly thereafter she considered themselves as engaged.) She was content with the fragments of life legend which emerged in bits and pieces—that he was born in Shanghai in 1928 of a German father and Portuguese mother. The family went to the States shortly after World War II when George was 19 years old and became naturalized American citizens. Sometime later—George was vague about these things—his parents died. For a time he was a merchant seaman, claimed at least some college background, got a start in construction work and ultimately acquired his own business. He gave an address in Las Vegas, Nevada (actually the street address of a motel which had no record of him) and told Eleanor that he had recently sold his business and come to Europe as a tourist for an indefinite period.

Contributing to George's acceptance were outward evidences of thorough Americanism. He had an appetite for crunchy peanut butter, wanted bacon and eggs for breakfast, read Newsweek to keep up with events, and regularly followed the comic strip tribulations of Dick Tracy, Dennis the Menace and Peanuts. He was a fast man with a bingo card at Embassy Club social evenings, often handling Eleanor's card as well as his own. He paid devoted attention to Eleanor's mother, called her "Mom"—which flattered and pleased her—and brought both of them gifts on appropriate occasions. And, somehow, Eleanor saw nothing unusual in the coincidence that her fiance, with his professed background, shared her enthusiasm for the writings of American naturalist Henry Thoreau and the Indian poet Tagore. To make everything just right, George Stein was also a jazz buff. ×

Although George professed to want marriage as soon as possible, they reached mutual agreement that Eleanor would first finish out her embassy tour which was due to expire before the end of the year. It thus seemed quite natural for George to decide that, rather than return to Las Vegas, he would go to West Berlin and look for a temporary job during the pre-marriage period. He made the move in April, renting a room in the household of 71-year-old Ernst Matzdorff, a kindly and trusting pensioner whose role in this case was that of intermediary and innocent dupe. Soon after reaching

FIGURE 6. ELEANOR AND "GEORGE STEIN" WHO POSED AS AN AMERICAN
The start of a romance that became a nightmare. Their first meeting; a candid-shot.

West Berlin, George told Eleanor he had found a job translating technical papers but did not identify his employer. So far as Matzdorff knew, his American tenant was a draftsman of some kind but he never actually saw him do any work. (Parenthetically, it was determined later that George registered with West Berlin authorities, as required by law, as a German national, not an American, and gave his birthplace as Dairen, China, not Shanghai. Matzdorff was unware of this.) Matzdorff knew of the romance with Eleanor since she and George occasionally visited each other in Berlin or West Germany and the letter and telephone correspondence between them was frequent.

It may never be determined whether the original Soviet/East German operational plan called for a longer development of Eleanor with a more sophisticated recruitment approach than already described. However, it seems probable that a totally unexpected event caused some revision of planning and determined the course and timing of the entrapment which followed. This was George's involvement in an automobile accident on 31 May in East Berlin only hours before he was due to leave by air to visit Eleanor and her mother in West Germany. (George was unquestionably in East Berlin to confer with his Soviet or East German superiors.)

The accident hospitalized George with severe facial bruises, an ugly abdominal swelling and the prospect of an operation, apparently for removal of the spleen. (Both Eleanor and Matzdorff were later to see convincing evidence of physical damage and Matzdorff, in the final stages of this case, actually saw a fresh abdominal incision, indicating that an operation was performed.)

Eleanor, unaware of the accident, waited in vain at the Bonn airport on the evening of the 31st and finally went home. A few hours later Matzdorff called from West Berlin to say he had received an anonymous telephone message that George had been injured in an accident and wanted Eleanor to be notified. He had no other details and no idea where George was. Eleanor, whose German was inadequate, frantically enlisted the help of the night-duty embassy telephone operator to notify West Berlin authorities to try and locate her fiance. Checks quickly established that he was not in any West Berlin hospital. Two days later Eleanor finally received a letter from George, postmarked West Berlin, telling of the accident but omitting his whereabouts. On 3 June Matzdorff telephoned with word that a stranger had visited him to say that George was recovering in East Berlin's Friedrichhain hospital. Eleanor then telephoned the hospital directly and was able to speak with George who was eager to see her. Without hesitation, she boarded the first plane for Berlin, took a taxi directly to the hospital in the East sector (this was before the Wall), and the couple were happily reunited at George's hospital bed. She accepted without question a somewhat flimsy explanation of how he happened to be driving a car which was not his own in the Soviet-controlled portion of the divided city at the time of the accident. This first visit was without incident and so was a second on the following day after Eleanor had spent the night at Matzdorff's house in West Berlin. At George's urgent plea she agreed to fly up to Berlin for additional visits the following weekend. This was to prove her doing; the plans for her ordeal and recruitment were already complete.

On 10 June, during her next visit with George, he casually handed her a roll of film and asked as a favor that she leave it in his room in West Berlin. It was so adroitly done that she had no premonition of danger. But as she left the hospital a few hours later her life suddenly turned into a nightmare. East German security agents, accompanied by an interpreter, arrested her at the door, pulled the film from her purse, accused her of espionage, thrust her in a waiting car and drove her to the fenced-in house mentioned at the start of this account. After the humiliating body search, the process of rough interrogation and face-slapping (all part of a deliberate shock technique to destroy her self-control) continued for hours without letup. She was shown photo prints, ostensibly from George's film roll, which depicted tanks, bridges and other scenes of military significance as evidence of espionage. About midnight she was bundled off temporarily to a new location—a compound area—to which George had been transferred, hospital bed and all, and the two were brought face to face to identify each other. George's histrionic abilities were not inconsiderable; he forcefully argued with the East German agents in her presence that she was innocent of any wrongdoing. He admitted giving her the film but insisted she was unaware of the contents. After a period of further interrogation in a separate room, Eleanor was permitted to see her fiance alone for a few moments. She found him stretched on the bed, weeping and in apparent despair. He begged forgiveness for having put them both in such serious danger and "confessed" in whispers that since coming to Berlin he had been secretly working for a Western intelligence service. This was patently untrue, as confirmed later, but Eleanor believed him. Desperate as her own plight appeared, she was equally, if not more, concerned for the safety of George Stein. She was, at this point, softened up and ripe for the recruitment demand (with guarantee that George would be protected) which was put to her by the uniformed Soviet who confronted her as soon as she had been returned to the original interrogation point. As noted at the start of this case summary, Eleanor accepted recruitment, promised to return to East Berlin on 24 June, but put loyalty above love and disclosed the whole story to the American Embassy security officer as soon as she was safely back in West Germany.

What followed in this case is anti-climactic but perhaps worth covering briefly. Matzdorff, completely unwitting of George's duplicity and what had happened to Eleanor, continued to play the role of warmhearted landlord and several times prior to 24 June visited George in the East Berlin

hospital and reported him progressing well after an operation. At George's early request, Matzdorff delivered the former's personal effects from his West Berlin room to the baggage checkroom at Tempelhof airfield. George explained this arrangement would be more convenient to him since he intended to fly directly back to the United States or to Bonn to be with Eleanor as soon as he was released from the hospital. (By this means, nothing of significance belonging to George was left behind in his room where it might later have fallen into hands of the authorities; the luggage itself was claimed at Tempelhof by persons unknown on the morning of 24 June.)

Eleanor, finally convinced that she had been cruelly tricked, had no intention of going to East Berlin on 24 June, nor would this have been permitted. She did, however, consent to play out a game until that date on the unlikely but faint chance that George Stein might be lured to West Berlin where authorities were ready to arrest him. The indefatigable George telephoned her on 22 June to make sure she would be coming on the 24th. He said he could now leave the hospital. Eleanor promised to come to West Berlin but said she was too frightened to cross the sector border to the East. George lovingly reassured her that everything would be alright but that if she insisted she could register at the West Berlin Hilton and he would contact her there.

Eleanor took a plane to Tempelhof on the morning of 24 June, accompained throughout the day by an inconspicuous security escort to ensure her safety. She had hardly left for the airport when George, still the devoted fiance, telephoned "Mom" to make sure she was on the way and seemed delighted to hear that she was. At the Berlin Hilton, Eleanor waited most of the day. Finally, George telephoned, again urging her to come to East Berlin. Eleanor refused. At this point, and for the first time, George dropped all deception. He brusquely told her she "must" come, then the telephone connection went dead. Within the hour Eleanor was airborne out of Berlin and the case of George Stein, "false flag American," was ended.

Only a footnote remains. The Soviet principal in this rather elaborate operation against an American and, through her, against an American installation, was readily identified by physical description and photo comparison. He was Yevgeniy Alekseyevich Zaostrovtsev, KGB American Department staff officer, well-known to American intelligence

FIGURE 7. "THE COLONEL," YEVGENIY A. ZAOSTROVTSEV

services. He had previously served as Cultural Attache of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and, without fanfare, had been expelled for espionage in 1959. In Berlin, under diplomatic cover as 2nd Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Communist East Germany, he was already known and identified as an American-operations specialist.

Diplomatic Personnel

Not long ago a Foreign Service career officer with the diplomatic rank of first secretary was the object of an unsuccessful Soviet recruitment attempt at his post in Europe. The attempt was made by a KGB officer under diplomatic cover as a second secretary. No crude invitation to espionage was involved, nor any vestige of intimidation; the Soviet politely but persistently pressed the FSO to feed him statistical and analytical economic information which the "diplomat" said he would incorporate into unsigned articles he claimed to submit on a regular basis, without knowledge of his embassy, to a limited circulation magazine for a specialized readership in the USSR. The KGB officer offered to split with the American the generous fees which he said he re-

ceived for his articles. As further inducement, he promised to reciprocate by passing the FSO "useful" economic data from inside the USSR. The American diplomat was assured that his "cooperation" would be kept absolutely secret. When the indignant FSO, whose periodic diplomatic/social contacts with the Soviet were approved by his own embassy superiors and fully reported in writing, pointed out that acceptance of the Soviet's proposal, even were only unclassified information involved, would constitute an act of disloyalty to the Foreign Service, the KGB officer sought to brush this aspect aside with the preposterous claim that no service loyalty was involved since he had only made a personal and private proposition which would benefit each of them individually and their countries as well.

The above incident serves to illustrate that the career Foreign Service officer, although not in the "second class citizen" target category against which Soviet Intelligence is most openly and aggressively active, is nevertheless subject to close and continuing KGB scrutiny and cultivation abroad. Reasons for this interest are obvious. The FSO has daily access to classified and often vital information on foreign policy matters. Typically, as the result of his normal diplomatic activity, he is in a position to reflect not only American policy viewpoints but also other information of interest to the Soviets which he has obtained through conversations or in negotiations with friendly foreign diplomatic counterparts. He is capable of reporting in intimate detail on personal strengths and weaknesses of Foreign Service colleagues at his post of assignment and elsewhere. He is familiar with the physical layout and security procedures of his embassy and with Foreign Service policies, regulations and procedures applicable throughout the world. Finally—and most important in any long-range consideration—he has a career potential which could ultimately lead to a position of influence in the shaping of American foreign policy.

In working against American diplomatic personnel abroad, Soviet Intelligence takes maximum advantage of the fact that social contact is a normal diplomatic function which opens up plausible and convenient channels of direct approach to Foreign Service officers for cultivation. Although the Soviets have less hope of developing successful recruitment operations within the somewhat circumscribed diplomatic milieu than they do within the generally less experienced and more informal "junior employee" environment, a program of systematic probing, elicitation and character assessment is maintained and the KGB can be expected to follow up on any personal weaknesses or vulnerabilities suspected or uncovered. All members of the Soviet official community contribute to this program. Even legitimate Soviet diplomats (outnumbered as they are in most countries by intelligence officers with diplomatic cover) must report on all American and other foreign contacts to the KGB and be guided by the latter in whatever exploitation is determined for intelligence as well as diplomatic purposes. In his book "Principles of Diplomatic Service," published in 1964, former Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Valerian Aleksandrovich Zorin may well have had the pervasive role of the KGB in mind when he noted ". . . every word of a diplomat is strictly controlled. In important matters, no officer is allowed to say anything on his own initiative which may have material significance."

Non-official Americans: Businessmen and Students

> ". . . motivational and vulnerability factors that can be exploited in establishing relationships leading to eventual recruitment (of businessmen): willingness to accept financial reward for passage of technical information and new models . . . and a desire to trade with the Soviet Union or other countries of the socialist camp . . ."
>
> "American students (abroad) form an ideal nucleus out of which we can recruit future penetrations of the U.S. Government . . . American students, as a rule, are short of funds . . . are for the most part very independent and free to pick their own friends . . . they lack maturity of experience in life."

Although the KGB official quotations cited above are illustrative of Soviet interest in American businessmen and students abroad, they tell only part of the story. The long-range interest in both categories is quite clear; businessmen, and most particularly technical experts of many categories stationed temporarily abroad, are, from the Soviet viewpoint, more accessible and easier to approach in a foreign environment where their guard is down and counterintelligence scrutiny is generally less severe than in the United States. Recruitments, if successful abroad, can of course in many cases produce valuable technological and scientific information on the spot. However, the highest potential is in the future when the agent returns to

the United States and can be used as a penetration of scientific research and industrial centers or even as a spotter and recruiter for Soviet Intelligence in such centers. Students abroad, depending on their academic speciality, may also have long-range potential in the S&T field. However, their greatest potential is for future penetration of U.S. Government agencies.

There is an additional and local Soviet interest in private Americans abroad. They may be targets because of their access to other Americans in official positions who are, themselves, primary targets of Soviet Intelligence. In this sense they have value as intermediaries since they can be used to provide Soviet intelligence officers and agents with direct access to other Americans.

Experience has repeatedly shown that an American abroad without diplomatic or official status, living in a foreign country as a businessman or student, is unfortunately not likely to realize that he is automatically and routinely a target of KGB or GRU attention or even to become suspicious of "friendly" cultivation by Soviets. As far as Soviet techniques and gambits are concerned, he is generally completely unaware of them.

Recently, a young American technician, a member of a data processing team from a U.S. firm engaged under contract to the government of a Moslem country, reported with considerable embarrassment a Soviet attempt to recruit him after a series of calculated developmental steps which completely failed to arouse his suspicions.

He and his wife, an average couple with no surface vulnerabilities, met a Soviet diplomat and his wife under innocent circumstances at a local social function. The meeting led to further contact between the two families, always at the initiative of the Soviet. The first time the Soviet and his wife visited the home of the American couple, the diplomat brought with him five unsolicited bottles of liquor. In retrospect, the liquor was not intended as a casual gift, although it may have seemed so to the American, but rather as a form of bait. Even though the American and his wife did not drink, they knew that in the local Moslem country, where a strict prohibition law was in effect, any form of liquor could command a high black market price. Lacking any official status, they had no access to diplomatic commissary facilities at which liquor was available to foreigners. The Soviet, an intelligence officer, was perfectly aware of all these factors. He was quite agreeable when the American foolishly offered to purchase the five bottles at the low diplomatic price. This transaction, in Soviet eyes, was a potentially compromising one for the American since any violation by him of local prohibition regulations, if exposed, could be a source of embarrassment to his firm and to the American Embassy, both extremely sensitive to anything which might jeopardize carefully-nurtured relations with the Moslem government. This purchase of alcohol by the American was only the first; he continued to buy more as his relationship with the Soviet ripened into close friendship.

The Soviet intelligence officer's wife also had a role to play and this, too, was part of the developmental technique. She asked the American's wife to give her English lessons in exchange for lessons in Russian. These began on a regular basis, and the American woman unwittingly contributed to the Soviet process of assessment for vulnerabilities which might be exploitable. She complained openly about difficult living conditions in the Moslem area and particularly about the lack of commissary and PX privileges. The result; the American couple began to accept flour and other Soviet commissary items. Apparently these were offered and accepted as gifts, the object being to stimulate friendship with the Soviets and to create in the Americans a sense of personal obligation to the Soviet diplomat who was easing their living conditions.

Finally, the Soviet intelligence officer felt ready to show his hand, basing his chances of success primarily on friendship and, if that failed, on financial inducement. He invited the American couple to his home and drew the husband aside. Characteristically, he first sought reassurance that they were friends, which the American readily and sincerely gave. The Soviet then quite frankly asked the technician to obtain certain computer data for him from his home office in the United States. This was advanced technical information which the American knew was withheld by his company and not made available either to his Moslem host country or to the Soviet Union. He asked the Soviet if the latter was seriously asking him to procure classified information; if so, it was tantamount to asking him to commit treason. The intelligence offi-

...first hedged on use of the word "classified," then expressed hurt and renewed his request on the basis that it was appropriate in view of their friendship. When the American reiterated his friendship but continued to refuse the request, the Soviet switched to his fall-back position. There was no subtlety about it. If the American would agree to work for the Soviets, the latter would assist him to go into business for himself, presumably in a technical field in the United States, and would finance the venture completely. The full implications of this proposal hit the American at this point for the first time, and he quickly collected his wife and departed.

It took nearly 10 days of soul-searching for the shaken American couple to decide what to do. They were embarrassed and worried on several accounts. They knew they had both been naive. They had purchased liquor in violation of the laws of their host country. (It is not clear whether they actually sold it on the black market which would have been an additional violation.) The acceptance of Soviet commissary supplies was another mark against them. Nevertheless, they made the right decision and went to appropriate American authorities with the full story.

Although American students abroad have been a target of Soviet Intelligence for many years, recent evidence from many parts of the world testifies to intensification of the effort and the application of a variety of techniques to bring about initial contact under seemingly innocent circumstances, to sustain cultivation and ultimately to attempt recruitment.

Soviets abroad under official cover of one form or another often enroll in classes at local universities or institutes on a part-time study basis, ostensibly to perfect a language or for area study purposes. Such courses serve as ideal means of opening up contacts with foreign students, including Americans, and the Soviets who are allowed to take them are almost without exception intelligence officers who show more interest studying their fellow students than in the subject matter of the courses.

There are, of course, many other ways to meet and cultivate American students. The latter are frequently sought out by official Soviets and tempted to augment their usually modest income by giving English language lessons or doing translations. Casual meetings, real or contrived, at student centers, lectures, concerts, private parties, etc. are usually followed up with attempts to establish a social relationship which, in turn, often takes on clandestine aspects after a period of assessment. In the Western Hemisphere, tactics of this sort have been notably evident in Mexico City where there is always a large colony of full and part-time American students and also a large number of Soviet intelligence officers active in operations directed against the neighboring United States. The KGB itself regards Mexico (and the Latin America area generally) as providing a particularly attractive environment for successful recruitment of American students who plan—or can be directed—to enter U.S. Government service. A documentary KGB analysis of American students in Latin America explains why in the following words:

> "Most come from the American middle class. Frequently their sole means of livelihood is either a grant under the G. I. Bill for prior Army service or a small allowance from relatives. Students in this category tend to be more liberal in outlook; they are receptive to local nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments. They also tend to resent . . . economic and foreign policies of the U.S. Government and U.S. colonial policy toward Latin America . . . all of these considerations, plus favorable operating conditions for Soviet Foreign Intelligence, greatly facilitates our operational program in Latin America."

An additional method by which Soviet Intelligence comes in contact with American students is through Soviet exchange students who, since the mid-1950's, have been found in increasing numbers in academic centers in Europe, South America and other parts of the world. Many of these are already professional intelligence officers serving initial "probationary" or area familiarization tours in the West as students in preparation for subsequent assignment abroad under official cover, often in the same geographic area in which they have studied. For example, Nikolay Georgiyevich Korotkikh, an exchange student at London University during the academic year 1964-65, reappeared in Denmark in 1966 with diplomatic rank of third secretary and the function of press attache. Korotkikh assiduously built up American student contacts in London and has continued to do so in Denmark by frequenting a Copenhagen language school for foreigners and an international student center in the Danish capital. Similarly, Valentin Ivanovich Ilyintsev, a 33-year-old exchange student at Yale University during the academic year 1963-64, showed up in India in 1965 in the diplomatic role of cul-

tural attache. To date, his principal activity in New Delhi has been the pursuit and cultivation of Americans. Ilyintsev is a KGB officer, probably from the American Department, whose probationary period in the United States was to learn about America and American life and to perfect his English. At Yale, he was conspicuously unqualified for graduate-level work in his ostensible field of interest (municipal government) and finished out his year as an occasional class auditor, without serious study or submission of any academic work.

Soviet exchange students in the West who may not be intelligence officers are, in many cases, used as agents by Soviet Intelligence. Although lacking in intelligence training, they are directed by residency officers to report on and assess American fellow students in the country where they are studying.

Although there are many cases which could be cited, the following two—in abbreviated form—will suffice to show how Soviet Intelligence attempts to recruit and expl. American students abroad.

In the first case, which developed rapidly into a recruitment operation, the target was an American graduate student working on his doctorate in a scientific field at Oxford University. When he expressed interest in possible post-doctoral study in the USSR to a Soviet graduate student, also at Oxford under an exchange program, the latter elicited personal history information from the American, including the fact that he had been employed by a large defense contractor in the United States, engaged in the manufacture of aircraft and missile components, and would probably return to work for the same company.

This led to a meeting with a Soviet official in London, an identified intelligence officer specializing in science and technology. The exchange student dropped out of the picture after making the initial introduction. Thereafter, the Soviet official and the American had a series of meetings which at first focused on the prospects of advanced study in the USSR. All of the meetings, at Soviet request, were held in pubs and restaurants rather than at the Soviet Embassy, and the American, quite early in the relationship, was told never to telephone the Embassy.

Finally, after a relatively short period of cultiv tion and assessment (including a requirement th the American provide in writing a detailed sum mary of his educational background and scientif specialization), the Soviet officer held out the carr of expense-free study in the USSR at a later da and promised that no Soviet visa need appear the American's passport. In return for this, h asked the American to help him obtain technical i formation of a type not normally available to S viets. The American student referred to his em ployment background and its military applicati and asked if this was the kind of information de sired. The Soviet officer replied "You catch on fast." The American, realizing that he had blu dered into a situation beyond his depth, report the entire affair to American authorities. How ever, before the relationship was completely broke off, the Soviet had put it on a clandestine ba (meetings in the countryside, away from possibl detection) and had offered the American a month salary during the remainder of his stay abroad, pl a sum which would equal half his normal sala after he returned to the United States and resum his defense-related scientific work.

Somewhat less dramatic but nevertheless revea ing was the plight of a young American student Vienna who in early 1967 discovered that for near a year, and without suspicion, he had been exploit by Soviet Intelligence as a spotter and assessor fellow Americans. The technique used in this ca has been noted in other areas. The Soviet intel gence officer, with considerable finesse, capitalize on the immaturity and lack of sophistication whi Soviets expect to find in many American studen abroad.

Only 24 years old and not a college graduate, th American arrived in Austria in the spring of 19 to study German. He moved into a student dorm tory. Shortly after his arrival, he came into soci contact with Albert Georgiyevich Fateyev, an inte preter attached to the Russian translation secti of the International Atomic Energy Agency in V enna. During the summer, the American, one his German teachers and the Soviet often we fishing together. By the end of the summ Fateyev suggested that he and the American ha an occasional dinner alone in downtown Vien Within a matter of weeks, this arrangement h been unobtrusively converted into regular week

FIGURE 8. KGB OFFICER ALBERT G. FATEYEV
He skillfully duped the American student

meetings, at a set time and pre-arranged meeting point in the city, after which the two would go to one of the many small restaurants on the outskirts of Vienna.

Fateyev was adroit. Fifteen years older than the student, he flatteringly treated the American as his intellectual equal—which he was not. It never occurred to the American to question why the older and more experienced man should be spending so much time with him. The Soviet played on his knowledge that the American, in junior college, had once taken a psychology course and apparently fancied himself something of an expert in human assessment. Initial queries were always about the American's impressions of his friends, most of them students. Next—and this is one of the oldest Soviet tricks in the book—Fateyev asked the American to contribute an article for a journalist friend (never identified) who was preparing a series of stories on the Austro-American Society in Vienna. The student gladly turned out a 10-page article, for which the Soviet offered to pay. The American, not short of money at that particular time, refused payment and the patient Soviet did not press the point. The student, however, did accept Soviet commissary items at a cost considerably less than the Vienna market price. He also accepted a transistor radio as a birthday present. Within a short time, Fateyev said his journalist friend was expanding his series and wanted more written reports—in the form of psychological assessments—of Vienna students, particularly Americans. The student was soon regularly submitting such reports and scarcely noted at the time that he was continually subjected by Fateyev to follow-up questions on each of the Americans he had written about. He saw nothing peculiar about other Soviet suggestions. For example, that he reduce his Austrian contacts and concentrate on making friends with Americans at a Stanford University extension program in operation near Vienna and that he broaden his social range by having lunch every day at the Vienna Institute of European Studies where there were other Americans to be met. Finally, always in the background, but for some reason not acted upon, was Fateyev's suggestion that he seek local employment at the American Consulate in Vienna.

By early 1967, several developments began to plant and nourish a seed of doubt. Fateyev had become overly concerned when the student's written assessment reports began to fall off. He kept pushing the American to keep on writing with arguments such as "I don't care what you write, but write something for me." There was a nervous insistence about this. The student also found it peculiar that the Soviet urged him to remain in Vienna longer than he had planned, telling him that if money was a problem, "I could give you $100 a month . . . you are such a good guy you should continue your studies."

The American's ultimate—and hesitant—decision to report what was going on to the local embassy security officer was triggered by a single event which finally put what had been going on into disturbing perspective. Fateyev one day handed him a cash payment of about $60 in Austrian currency, explaining that this was from the still unidentified journalist friend for the "work" he had done. There was also the promise of more payments if he kept at his writing for the Soviets. In making the payment, Fateyev requested a signed receipt.

The American student, recounting his story, could hardly believe that he had been duped over a period of many months by an intelligence officer

primarily concerned with the American target. Unwitting as he may have been, he had met regularly on a semi-clandestine basis with the officer, had been given a series of requirements and fulfilled them, and, at the end, had accepted and receipted for payment. His comment at the end of his debriefing was illuminating: "I just can't believe it. You read of these things in the newspaper and you think it can't happen to you. I can see it now, but still, in a sense, it is hard to believe I was involved . . . it wasn't just for a few weeks, it was for almost a year!"

Relative to the above case, it is appropriate to note that American students abroad are sometimes suspicious of Soviet cultivation in its initial stages but receive wrong advice when they ask for guidance from American officials who are not informed or alert on matters of obvious security concern. In one such case, an American student was being paid regular and fairly substantial sums by a Soviet exchange student to translate into English articles from the local press. He asked an American consular officer if there was any objection to this arrangement and was told there was none. No official record was made of the query and it was not reported at the time to the embassy security officer. The incident only came to light months later when the student returned to report that the Soviet had tried to recruit him as an agent for Soviet Intelligence. Had the American been referred to the security office at the time of his first visit, he would have received appropriate guidance. The consular officer failed to appreciate that no Soviet student in the West has legitimate need for English-language translations of press items nor funds to pay for them on his own.

III. ASSETS OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE AMERICAN TARGET ABROAD

"In countries where there is a concentration of Americans of intelligence interest, our residencies systematically study their working conditions and seek ways to establish contact with them. We assemble information from agent sources, personal contacts and other forms of observation on the staffing and work patterns within U.S. installations and on the employment status, behavior pattern and attitude toward contact with Soviets of our individual targets."

Soviet Nationals

Although General Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Sakharovskiy, chief of the KGB Foreign Directorate, is known to have complained in a 1961 directive to all residencies abroad that KGB officers, by personally developing contacts with Americans, were exposing themselves and their aims to counterintelligence detection, it is clear that in practice Soviet intelligence officers throughout the world are, in fact, seeking out personal contact with potential targets for recruitment. Examples of this have already been given in this paper, and there are others too numerous to mention without belaboring the point.

It was noted early in this study that in recent years KGB officers have been observed in sometimes remote quarters of the globe concentrating their efforts against Americans abroad. Linguistically qualified and familiar with American life and characteristics, they directly cultivate, in many cases, the targets against which they are working. Occasionally, in the early cultivation stage, they have been known to use a "false flag," i.e., represent themselves as Canadians or English-speaking European nationals.

In India, to cite an example of an area of intense KGB activity against Americans, at least one experienced American Department specialist has been present—and in direct contact with American target category personnel—in each of the past 10 years. During portions of the period, several were present at the same time. One of the American Department officers was involved socially with three American officials and personally cultivated a code clerk and several American secretaries. Another was in touch with at least eight official Americans, including a Foreign Service officer and a code clerk. A third maintained developmental relationships with at least seven U.S. officials of various categories as well as a number of non-official Americans. A fourth, stationed away from New Delhi, was observed to be extremely active in personal development of Americans.

When one adds the record of known American Department officers to that of other known and suspect Soviet Intelligence personnel (more than 30 in all) who were directly involved in operations against Americans in India during the same period, the evidence is even more disturbing. Soviet Intelligence contacts, of varying depth and duration, were established with nearly 70 American officials



FIGURE 9. AMERICAN EMBASSY, NEW DELHI
KGB American Department specialists have been active against its personnel

plus a minimum of 18 technical and "junior employee" category personnel (code clerks, guards and secretaries) and at least 25 private American citizens. Several dozen of the contacts observed involved direct cultivation which was particularly intensive.

In addition to staff officers under diplomatic or other official cover in the West, Soviet Intelligence in working against overseas Americans also makes selective use of Illegals. These, as noted earlier, are Soviet intelligence officers abroad under false, non-Soviet identities with complete but spurious documentation as citizens of other countries. Some serve in the West for periods of many years and engage in various types of commercial or other legitimate cover activity tailored to fit their intelligence assignment. For example, KGB Lt. Colonel Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich Runge, an Illegal who defected to U.S. authorities in Germany in October 1967, posed successfully for 12 years as a West German citizen and self-employed small businessman. His work gave him the cover, mobility and spare time he needed to direct an important network of German agents.

Illegals living in the West may develop plausible contact in their cover capacity or in natural social situations with Americans of intelligence interest. What happens next follows no set pattern. The Illegal may act only as an unsuspected spotter and assessor, developing his target American to a point just short of a recruitment attempt. At this time another person, possibly another Illegal or an undisguised Soviet with official status, may appear on the scene in circumstances which do not arouse suspicion to take over the operation and carry it through to conclusion. At other times, a single Illegal may handle an operation through all phases from spotting to recruitment.

In certain situations, a Soviet Illegal may be dispatched from the USSR to attempt recruitment of an American on whom Soviet Intelligence already has information and at least a partial assessment. This kind of Illegal may pose as a tourist of some Western nationality as a free-lance journalist, traveling businessman or representative of a fictitious organization to promote world peace or some other worthy cause. His cover is generally superficial and, although properly documented for his role, he characteristically will be reluctant to discuss his background and occupation in depth. The ostensible naturalized South American of East European origin who in the case already described attempted to recruit a Department of State communications specialist of the same ethnic origin was an Illegal and probably of the single-mission category.

The Soviet intelligence services frequently use other Soviet citizens abroad in operations against Americans. These are Soviets, not members of the KGB or GRU, whose legitimate overseas positions, English language capabilities, wide social or commercial mobility or technical specializations enable them to perform certain functions on a part-time agent basis for one of the two services. The use of genuine exchange students in this way has already been noted. Other categories include legitimate Soviet foreign correspondents, scientists, foreign trade experts or diplomats whose true parent organization is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their most common role is as spotters and assessors of Americans with whom they are in frequent natural contact. Their reports on such contacts are submitted to the local KGB or GRU residency chief, carefully screened, and serve as a basis for the planning of recruitment operations. The original Soviet may then be used to introduce, under some plausible context, an intelligence officer—or an agent—to the American who is of target interest.

Communist Bloc Intelligence Officers

The intelligence services of the East European Communist Bloc work actively against Americans abroad in pursuit of their own objectives, especially when the ethnic background of an American official or employee is Eastern European. But, as noted earlier, there is evidence that the Bloc services, wherever they are represented outside the Bloc, orient a portion of their activity to Soviet interests. The case of the Bonn Embassy file clerk and her pseudo-American fiance, already recounted in detail, illustrates the involvement of the East German intelligence service in a KGB-controlled operation.

In several parts of the world there have been examples of the temporary turnover of a Bloc agent to direct Soviet Intelligence control. In one country, a naturalized West European citizen was recruited as an agent by the intelligence service of his Bloc country of origin. Although the Bloc service had

a long-term plan for use of the agent, he was promptly transferred to direct KGB control when it became apparent that he had natural access to a number of Americans of primary Soviet target interest. He was then used exclusively by the Soviets in support of an operation that took several years to develop. Later, in another country, he reverted to working for his parent Bloc service.

Similarly, in a non-European area, when a Communist Bloc intelligence officer learned that one of his local agents, up to then directed against targets of his own nationality, was giving private language lessons to an American official, the agent was turned over to a KGB American Department staff officer. For some time thereafter the KGB used the Bloc agent to accumulate information on the American. Since the language lessons were given in the American's home, the agent was told to become friendly with the household staff in order to identify the American's visitors. He was also asked to sketch a room plan of the house in as much detail as possible (possibly to support a planned audio operation) and to obtain a handwriting sample of the American by pretending to be skilled in handwriting analysis. The KGB officer wanted the signature sample at the bottom of a blank piece of paper and instructed the agent how to fold the paper so the American would not realize he was signing a blank sheet. (Such a sample could have been intended for use in a KGB forgery operation.)

Communist Bloc cooperation with Soviet Intelligence has shown itself in other ways. In some countries, contacts between American officials and their Soviet diplomatic opposite numbers are discouraged for political reasons related to American relations with the local government. Social relations with Bloc officials are usually less restricted. There have been many instances in which Bloc officials have invited Americans to parties which a KGB American specialist also attends. The latter's presence is certainly not always coincidence.

Other Foreign Nationals

Although Soviet intelligence officers actively seek direct contact with Americans abroad, many Americans are alert to Soviet objectives, do not want direct contact with Soviets, and instinctively shy away from opportunities which arise. To overcome this difficulty and also to defer or conceal the existence of Soviet interest, the KGB and GRU place strong emphasis on the development and manipulation of agents of other nationalities to assess, cultivate and develop Americans for eventual recruitment. One KGB document refers to this aspect of operational doctrine in the following words:

> "It has been our experience that in some countries where there is an efficient counterintelligence program against us . . . direct cultivation of Americans by our officers is generally not effective . . . in situations of this kind, it is preferable to use local agents to cultivate and assess Americans for us . . . the Rome residency (for example) trained a number of these agents and instructed them to become friendly with and collect information on Americans in specific installations and units. These included the political, economic, security and communications sections of the American Embassy, the Military Assistance Group, USIS and NATO forces in Italy."

There are several categories of foreign nationals used as agents against Americans abroad by the KGB and GRU and these will be noted, with several examples of their use, in the remaining pages of this section.

Third-National Diplomats

In Moscow, the KGB Counterintelligence Directorate (Second Chief Directorate) is responsible for security and counterintelligence operations against foreigners residing in or visiting the Soviet Union. As one of its many missions, this Directorate is charged with developing and carrying out an aggressive and overwhelmingly massive KGB operational program to penetrate foreign diplomatic installations in Moscow and to recruit foreign diplomatic personnel as Soviet agents during the period of their assignment to the USSR. Detailed description of the many facets of this program is beyond the scope of this study. It can be noted, however, that it brings to bear against all foreign diplomatic personnel vast KGB technical and agent resources in a completely controlled environment. The program over the years has been highly successful. One Soviet Intelligence defector estimated that at any given time in Moscow the KGB has at least one recruited agent within the diplomatic mission of each of the developing countries of the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America. The KGB has also had significant successes in recruitment operations against European and other Western diplomatic personnel in Moscow.

Although foreign diplomatic personnel recruited in Moscow may have immediate value as sources of intelligence information, their usefulness to the KGB is often greater after they leave the USSR. Normally, control of them is passed to the KGB's Foreign Directorate and their long-range exploitation continues as Soviet agents in subsequent assignments at home or elsewhere abroad. In addition to serving as Soviet Intelligence penetrations of their own governments, they frequently play a hard to detect role in Soviet operations against Americans in their own countries and in other countries. As neutral or Western diplomats they are able to establish official and often close personal relationships with American counterparts more easily than Soviet representatives in the same area. Thus, their most important contribution to Soviet Intelligence operations against Americans is their capability, under normal-appearing circumstances, to cultivate and thoroughly assess American officials on Soviet behalf. They also serve as convenient channels for the introduction of Americans to Soviet Intelligence officers at times and places of Soviet choosing. Diplomatic "collaborators" from neutral countries, whether recruited in Moscow or brought under Soviet influence elsewhere, are favorite intermediaries for Soviet approaches to Americans, as the following quotation from a KGB document illustrates:

> "No matter the location, one . . . effective way to establish contact with Americans is indirectly via collaborators from neutral countries, particularly embassy personnel of neutral countries which nevertheless maintain good relations with Americans. Examples of such embassies would be those of India, Burma, the Arab states and the Latin American countries. In order to come in contact with Americans in this way, our intelligence officers seek to establish cooperative relationships with representatives of such neutral countries."

The case summary which follows is a vivid example of Soviet Intelligence use against Americans of a high-level third-national agent who was recruited in Moscow—in this instance by the GRU since it had already handled the preparatory phase of the recruitment operation outside the USSR.

Many readers are probably familiar with the well-publicized highlights of the espionage career of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroem, secretly a highly successful agent of the GRU for nearly 15 years until his arrest in 1963 and subsequent sentence to life imprisonment. He is best known for having betrayed to the Soviets the entire Swedish air defense system, an incalculable loss to his country. Also well covered has been that part of his career (1952-57) when he was Swedish Air Attache in the United States and systematically collected or microfilmed literally tens of thousands of American technical publications and military documents, many of them highly classified, for his Soviet masters, meanwhile cutting an elegant swath in Washington diplomatic and official society. Published studies have dwelt on the absorbing psychological makeup of the man himself, an able and impeccable career officer of a "friendly" neutral country with a calm facade behind which lay a Walter Mitty world of fantasy, an unsatisfied ego of fantastic proportions, a hunger for personal recognition and for involvement in world-shaping events. These were fatal personality weaknesses which the GRU correctly analyzed in the late 1940's, if not even earlier, and thereafter faultlessly exploited and financially rewarded.

Most pertinent to the subject matter of this study, however, is the clear "Americans abroad" aspect of the Wennerstroem case which runs through it from beginning to end. At the time of his formal recruitment in 1949 by the GRU in Moscow, where he was serving as Swedish Air Attache, Wennerstroem was told it was not Sweden the Soviets were worried about, but rather the United States, against which all possible resources had to be employed. From the first day of his GRU career he was directed against Americans—first in Moscow, then in Stockholm, Germany and Spain (and, of course, in the United States).

Wennerstroem's first mission was to obtain, above all, the closest possible contacts within the American Embassy in Moscow which the Soviets in 1949 regarded as the key outpost of the NATO alliance.

He was asked to collect names, positions, biographic details and personal characteristics of embassy personnel, an assignment he could fulfill easily since he already knew many American diplomats and military officers, some of whom had previously served in Stockholm. As Wennerstroem himself said after his arrest: "I very quickly got in at the American Embassy. This embassy had a distinctly dominating position among the diplomatic corps in Moscow, and if one secured entrée there, the rest (information of interest to the

Soviets) came almost by itself." It appears to be thanks chiefly to the "confidences" of American colleagues, who accepted him without question for what he appeared to be, that Wennerstroem collected information not only on personnel, but also items of information on the newly formed Strategic Air Command (about which the Soviets desperately wanted intelligence) including likely SAC target areas within the USSR in the event of war.

Returning from Washington to Stockholm in 1957 (the U.S. assignment, it may be noted, was an unforeseen bonus as far as the Soviets were concerned), Wennerstroem was posted to the Swedish Defense Command until retirement from active military duty in 1961. During this period, American requirements continued to be important. On GRU instructions he was to maintain intimate connections with military personnel of the American Embassy. Once again, he found this easy since he was popular with Americans and regularly invited to all embassy social affairs. In his Defense Command office he was able to obtain and microfilm for the Soviets voluminous publications on American military aircraft and equipment.

In 1958 Wennerstroem was invited to spend several days in Wiesbaden, Germany, as house guest of a close friend, a prominent general at headquarters of the U.S. Air Forces, Europe. The Soviets insisted that he accept and even set the exact time for his visit in the month of July. He

FIGURE 10. SWEDISH AIR FORCE COL. STIG WENNERSTROEM
While American colleagues trusted him, his GRU masters paid him and fed his hidden ego

was instructed not to bother with airfield tours (it can be inferred that the Soviets already had these well-covered) but to remain close to his host and report anything of significance which might happen, possibly indicative that the GRU had reason to believe that something would happen. It did. Just prior to Wennerstroem's departure (he had been told to go directly to Berlin as a tourist for a clandestine meeting in the East sector with the Moscow "General" who controlled his espionage work), the Wiesbaden host had to leave suddenly by air for Turkey. When Wennerstroem reported this incident in East Berlin, the "General" immediately left the room "obviously to sent a telegram to Moscow," according to the Swedish agent. Only later did Wennerstroem learn that the sudden flight of his host to Turkey was connected with American preparations for military intervention in the Lebanon crisis.

Again in 1958, when Wennerstroem told the Soviets that some of his former American contacts were in Spain, he was instructed to take his vacation in that country, to renew the contacts and to learn as much as possible about Strategic Air Command forces and installations in Spain. (The GRU explained to him that lack of a Soviet official establishment in Spain handicapped intelligence coverage in that country.) Wennerstroem later was to say that after this trip, "I noticed a decrease in Soviet interest in my work in Sweden . . . the emphasis shifted to the possibility of placing me in Spain in some way or another."

This emphasis actually lay dormant for some time since Wennerstroem turned to espionage against his own country, with disastrous results for Sweden, and was able to maintain access to classified Swedish and American military information even after retirement in 1961, by obtaining a new job as disarmament consultant to the Swedish Foreign Office. However, the Soviets apparently were making long range preparations to place him in Spain after his projected full retirement in 1964. They spoke of this several times and only a few days before his arrest in June 1963 passed him a large sum of money for what was to have been an exploratory trip to Spain. Winnerstroem later testified that on this trip he was to decide, on the basis of GRU instructions, what American contacts he would establish for later exploitation. It seems likely the Soviets were thinking in terms of retirement living in southern Spain, close to the U.S. Polaris submarine base at Rota which is known to be a high-priority Soviet Intelligence target area. This supposition is based on Wennerstroem's testimony that his ultimate projected mission would be to collect naval information and particularly to attempt to determine the USSR target areas of American Polaris missiles.

Local Citizens

It is axiomatic that Soviet Intelligence, in seeking to acquire the desired information on the employment status and personal behavior patterns of target Americans and on their individual attitudes regarding contact with Soviets, must—and does—rely heavily on local nationals in each country abroad where both Soviets and Americans are stationed. Excluding for the moment local employees of U.S. installations (a category to be discussed separately), citizens of the host country are recruited—and sometimes utilized on an unwitting basis—in direct support of operations against American personnel. Their principal role is one of spotting and assessment of Americans with whom they are in contact socially or on an official basis because, as one KGB document states:

> "In cases where there is advanced information suggesting an American's readiness to collaborate with us on an ideological, political or material basis, or information of a compromising nature, we are able to plan specific steps—prior to personal contact—for drawing him into an agent relationship."

Local nationals, in fact, are an integral part of every agent network which each KGB and GRU residency is expected to establish in support of overall Soviet Foreign Intelligence objectives in each country. As far as the American target is concerned, the local citizen agent of the Soviets may be a bartender or waiter in favorite American off-duty haunts, a streetcorner carwasher in the vicinity of the American Embassy, a newsstand operator close to a U.S. installation, a travel agency representative, a real estate agent used by Americans in search for housing, a government official with frequent American dealings, a person who is socially or culturally prominent and who entertains Americans and mixes in the same social circles—the list is almost endless.

It is pertinent at this point to stress an inadequately appreciated fact—that it is standard, literally routine, practice of Soviet Intelligence abroad to identify the bars and cafes which become favorite hangouts of the highest priority American target group—the code clerks, Marine guards, secretaries and files personnel of American diplomatic, military and other official establishments. It is an easy matter for the Soviets to insert local agents into this milieu, agents who do not generally arouse the suspicion of their targets but are able to spot and become acquainted with those Americans who, through their own talk and behavior, indicate that they engage in the black market, are in debt, are promiscuous, drink too much, are frustrated in their jobs or resentful of their supervisors. Such persons and their vulnerabilities quickly become known to Soviet Intelligence officers and automatically become targets for more intense Soviet interest.

Illustrating the value of local nationals to Soviet Intelligence in the developmental phase of operations against Americans is the case of a restaurant proprietor in a foreign capital who for years—either as an agent or possibly as an unwitting tool—provided a unique environment in which the KGB was able to spot, assess and open up direct access to American Embassy employees of high priority intelligence interest.

The restaurant owner, a man of some wealth and socially popular in the medium and junior levels of the diplomatic "jet set," ran a catering service for the diplomatic community, including the Soviet Embassy. Both his restaurant and his private apartment, where he entertained foreigners lavishly, were frequented by Soviets, among them three identified KGB American Department officers.

Strongly attracted to American women, the restaurant owner—quite possibly on Soviet instructions—dated a number of American code clerks and secretaries and through them met and drew into his social circle practically all of the personnel of the embassy communications section. The KGB officers, almost always present at the same parties, had ample opportunity to study their potential targets at leisure. One code clerk, a divorcee, is known to have become an active target before she was transferred out of the area. One of the KGB officers succeeded in dating her (a relationship she did not report at the time) and a non-diplomatic employee of a neutral embassy who has since confessed to being a recruited KGB agent was given an assignment—in which he failed—to cultivate and seduce her.

Local Employees of U.S. Installations

Since cultivation of selected Americans for recruitment demands that Soviet Intelligence have the best possible picture of what the American does and what he is like, the KGB seeks inside information on American personnel of embassies and other official installations from all sources, including locally hired, non-American employees. The scope of this Soviet effort is such that it must be presumed that there are Soviet agents among the local employees in a great many U.S. embassies and military installations.

Once recruited, local employees are asked to describe individual Americans to whom they have access, their functions, work habits and routines, personal characteristics and attitudes, their associates, and as much as possible concerning their personal weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In addition, local employee agents are asked to supply phone directories, floor plans, personnel lists, samples of classification stamps and stationery, and to describe installation procedures, functions, document storage practices, etc. Finally, recruited local employees have the capability of emplacing concealed electronic listening devices on behalf of the Soviets.

Soviet Intelligence regards local employees of American installations as vulnerable to recruitment even though it recognizes that they are usually well-paid by local standards and anxious to retain their jobs. In spotting and collecting information on local employee recruitment candidates, they look for the individual who is more interested in additional money than sympathetic with American policies, who is discontented with his—or her—lot because of failure to be accepted as the professional or social equal of American colleagues in the same establishment, or the individual who can be compromised in one way or another and thus recruited on the basis of threat of exposure.

In attempting to recruit local employees of U.S. installations the Soviets have a particularly useful inducement lever to supplement the lure of money and other forms of reward. This is the fact that

in most countries espionage laws apply only to espionage against the local government and there is nothing illegal about a local employee reporting to the Soviets on American personnel and procedures or even passing American documents. In cooperating with the Soviets, the employee risks only loss of his or her job, with little or no possibility of legal action by the local government. In this connection, it is of interest to note that recently in several Western countries Soviet Intelligence officers have flouted tradition by breaking cover and openly admitting their intelligence status to local government officials. Where this has been done, it has been coupled with reassurance (recognizably false) that local Soviet intelligence activities need be of no concern to local security services since they are entirely directed against Americans.

In many countries of the Middle East which have large Armenian communities, American embassies employ Armenians, often in preference to other local nationals, because of their native intelligence and initiative. These are natural targets for Soviet recruitment. There have been numerous situations in recent years in Lebanon, Iran, Egypt and Syria in which Soviet intelligence officers of Armenian background have used the common bond of Armenian heritage and often the existence of relatives in the USSR to establish contact with and cultivate Armenian employees of American installations. There is evidence that a number of these employees have been successfully recruited by the KGB.

The fact that the KGB has also been successful in other areas can be rather dramatically illustrated by the following case history.

An aging and jealous lover, vindictively determined to keep his 33-year-old Belgian mistress completely dependent on him, was responsible for exposure in April 1967 of a KGB operation which had spanned five years, successfully achieved penetration of American Embassies in Tunisia and Belgium and, at the close, was directed at penetration of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

As a result, a KGB officer assigned to Brussels as a TASS correspondent was arrested and expelled from Belgium. Two of his intelligence colleagues who had also figured in the case, one a Soviet Embassy attache, the other a Soviet film representative, were quietly made aware that their continued presence in the country was unwelcome.

Neither the 70-year-old betrayer nor the female agent of the Soviets in this case has been publicly identified. The press, in somewhat abbreviated coverage, spoke of the woman only as "Madame X." The case, however, is worth attention in more precise detail here, not only as an extended operation against American personnel and installations abroad, but as illustrative of typical Soviet manipulative techniques against the American target and very patient persistence in the face of problems which threatened control of their agent and at times temporarily disrupted the operation.

"Madame X," mother of a small child and newly separated from her husband, went to Tunis in early 1962 to be near her stepfather, a Belgian citizen working for the Tunisian Government. She quickly obtained employment as a tri-lingual secretary/interpreter at the Bourguiba Institute of Languages and three months later found herself a recruited agent of Andrey Nikolayevich Zelenin, a KGB officer under cover as an attache of the Soviet Embassy.

Zelenin was enrolled at the Institute, ostensibly to study French, but obviously to survey the multinational student body for likely agent prospects. Zelenin promptly turned to "Madame X" with one of the most familiar of all opening gambits by

FIGURE 11. ANDREY N. ZELENIN
"Madame X" felt emotionally bound to him

Soviet Intelligence; he asked her to give private French lessons to his wife in their home. After each of these regular lessons, Zelenin was on hand to escort "Madame X" home. There is no question but that Zelenin rapidly acquired strong influence over his Belgian prospect; then and thereafter she was emotionally and perhaps romantically attracted to him. The feeling of personal obligation, which Soviet Intelligence always seeks to inspire, was certainly present. When he offered her money for information on faculty and student personnel of the Institute she accepted without question. Zelenin's interest was directed at the diplomatic and government personnel of several nationalities, particularly American and French, who were enrolled at the Institute. He wanted—and received—personal assessment data on them, descriptive details of possible vulnerabilities, need for money, interest in sexual affairs, etc.

In November 1962, to the delight of Zelenin, "Madame X" succeeded in obtaining a job at the American Embassy in Tunis. She was first in the shipping section of the General Services offices but soon moved to much more interesting positions (from the KGB point of view) as switchboard operator and receptionist. During her seven months of embassy employment, the Belgian woman fulfilled requirements from Zelenin which included sketches of embassy offices and names of their occupants and information on all embassy personnel. Zelenin put special stress on certain categories—the security officer and his American secretary, personnel of the Military Attache's office, and intelligence and communications personnel.

Although "Madame X" was to resign her embassy job in Tunis and return to Belgium in July 1963 to complete legal proceedings in connection with her long-pending divorce, Zelenin actually left before she did; he was transferred to the Soviet Embassy in Algiers. However, before departure he turned her over to a new Soviet contact, Yevgeniy Georgiyevich Muratov, a KGB officer serving as third secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Tunis. In the final months of her stay in North Africa, the Belgian woman continued to work on the requirements already given her and held pre-arranged clandestine meetings with Muratov on the outskirts of Tunis. Just before she left for Brussels, Muratov gave her instructions on how to make secret contact with a Soviet intelligence officer in Belgium.

Her first Soviet handler in Brussels was Vitaliy Dmitriyevich Balashov, an attache, whose interest in American targets had first been noted several years earlier during an initial intelligence assignment in Belgium as a student at the University of Brussels. Soviet plans for "Madame X" in Belgium were predictable: she was told to apply for a job at the American Embassy and Balashov said he would pay her no money until she was successful. By November 1963 the Belgian woman was in place in the American Embassy as a secretary.

"Madame X" met Balashov once a month to collect a KGB payment of about $100, to report on her progress in fulfilling Soviet requirements and to receive new instructions. She provided lists of embassy personnel, complete with home addresses, telephone numbers, vehicle license plates, etc. She gave personality information on an American female code clerk. Balashov asked her to report the names of Americans in what he called the "special services," a reference to intelligence personnel, whom he said she could easily spot by their irregular and often late working hours. Presumably, she did this also. She gave Balashov the location of Marine guard posts within the embassy installation but was unable to meet a requirement to pinpoint the exact guard shift schedules. At embassy parties and receptions she followed instructions to study the behavior of those present, to note those who drank too much and to report on relationships within the embassy group.

Balashov was apparently not completely satisfied. He told his agent about an "armored room" on a specific floor (showing accurate KGB pinpointing of the embassy communications area) and asked her to attempt to get assigned in or near this room. Alternatively, she was to seek transfer to the office of the Military Attache.

In April or May 1964, the Soviets began to encounter agent control problems which were to complicate their operation thereafter. "Madame X" broke contact with Balashov, ostensibly because of a strong feeling of physical revulsion for him. Another—and probably more important factor—was that she had become the mistress of a man old enough to be her father, the elderly Belgian lawyer who had arranged her divorce. This was an often stormy and violent love affair, but during its periods of relative calm and financial security the Belgian woman lost interest in espionage on behalf of the

FIGURE 12. VITALIY D. BALASHOV
The Belgian agent found him "repulsive"

Soviets. She also lost interest in American employment and, in fact, left her embassy job in August 1964.

Until January 1965 the KGB left her alone. In that month, Zelenin, the Soviet who had recruited her in Tunis and to whom she clearly felt a strong sense of personal attachment, turned up briefly in Brussels to bring her back under Soviet control. He came at the right time since her affair with the lawyer was by then in a period of estrangement and she was ripe for renewed involvement. Zelenin urged her strongly to re-apply for work at the American Embassy and introduced her to a new Soviet who would handle her, TASS correspondent Anatoliy Trifonovich Ogorodnikov. Perhaps to make the new Soviet more palatable to her than his predecessor had been, Zelenin played him up as a "boyhood friend." Zelenin then returned to his post in Algiers, believing his mission accomplished.

It did not quite turn out that way—again due to her love affair. "Madame X" did, in fact, reapply for American Embassy employment but was turned down on the basis of an undistinguished job performance record in the past. Having patched up her on-again off-again romance with the lawyer, she failed to keep several appointments with Ogorodnikov, and one day in the late spring or early summer, when she happened to meet him on the street, she told the Soviet that she was pregnant (true), expected to be married soon, and wanted no further contact. She followed this up by writing a letter to Zelenin, confirming what she had told his colleague.

Ogorodnikov's reaction was one of patience. There were no threats, as there could have been. He merely said he would continue to go to their established meeting place monthly in case she should change her mind.

Nearly a year went by without further incident, but the events which followed suggest that the KGB kept a watchful eye on "Madame X." In late July 1966, the Belgian woman (who had meanwhile experienced a miscarriage and had not been married), had an unusually violent quarrel with her lawyer-lover. When the latter actually attempted to strangle her, the romance broke up completely. It most likely was no coincidence that Ogorodnikov suddenly reappeared on the scene, handed her a gratuitous payment of several hundred dollars in Belgian francs and asked her to apply for a job at SHAPE Headquarters which was scheduled to be moved from Paris to Casteau, south of Brussels, within less than a year and would be in need of many new employees with her qualifications. New regular meeting arrangements were made and at each of these she was paid approximately $120 in francs.

During the period which followed, Ogorodnikov began to train his female agent in some of the more complicated techniques of espionage tradecraft—obviously anticipating need for more professional agent management after she should obtain employment with SHAPE and again become operationally active for the KGB.

She obtained a camera suitable for document photography, was trained in its use and submitted test films to her Soviet handler. Ogorodnikov set up a complicated system of clandestine meeting arrangements which included the use of danger signals and provision for emergency contacts. Finally, after personally reviewing her SHAPE application forms, Ogorodnikov in December 1966 told her he would be going home in the summer of 1967 and introduced her to the Soviet who would handle her after he was gone—Oleg Aleksandrovich Semikov, a Soviet film distribution representa-

FIGURE 12 VOLIY ODN
This KGB was pati... profes ...

tive in Belgium since 1964. Ogorodnikov told her that for the sake of security she would not see him again and her next meeting with Semikov would not take place until July 1967. If, however, she was able to get into SHAPE at Casteau before that time (it was to move there in March 1967), she was instructed to give the appropriate signal for an emergency meeting to inform Semikov. To keep her content, Ogorodnikov then paid her a sum in advance equivalent to five months' salary.

"Madame X" was arrested by Belgian security authorities in April 1967. She did not know it at the time, but more than six months earlier her frustrated lover had betrayed her to several Belgian officials on the basis of diary notes he had seen regarding her contacts with Soviets, and the allegation of her espionage work had been under investigation by both American and Belgian authorities. Ogorodnikov's arrest and expulsion came shortly after the confession of his agent, and, as previously noted, Balashov and Semikov were quietly and effectively discouraged from remaining longer in Belgium.

IV. ELECTRONIC PENETRATION OF AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS IN THE WEST

Soviet Intelligence doctrine, as already shown, stresses development of agent networks with direct access to American installations abroad, capable of reporting "from the inside" and, among other things, of emplacing concealed miniature microphone and transmitter listening devices.

The use of agents to plant microphones in American installations in the West is a logical and inevitable outgrowth of two lines of Soviet intelligence and security activity: (1) their development and use of technically sophisticated audio devices against foreign embassies in Moscow and (2) the high priority attached to their operational program against the American target abroad. Microphone operations inside the Bloc area are, of course, well known, including the scores of microphones found in recent years in American embassies in Moscow and Warsaw and the hundreds which have been found in other Western embassies and official residences (including American) in the Bloc countries. The Soviets are known to consider their Moscow technical operations as highly successful and valuable and have, through application over many years, acquired experience in audio operations which they have shared with the intelligence services of their Bloc colleagues. Not surprisingly, the Soviets have carried these techniques over to their operations in the West, particularly those directed against American installations. There is reliable information that the KGB, as early as 1953 or 1954, successfully introduced microphone-transmitters into American embassies in two Western European capitals. In one of these operations, the device was concealed in a flower pot brought into the embassy by a locally hired janitor or charwoman. There is also reliable information that the GRU engages in aggressive audio operations in the West and has successfully planted devices in certain offices or residences of NATO military and other governmental officials.

Confirmation of Soviet intentions in this field of espionage activity has been repeatedly obtained through double agent operations in at least a dozen countries. Soviet intelligence officers have discussed with their agents plans for emplacing devices in American and other Western offices, residences and even automobiles. Tangible indications of this kind first began to come to light more than 10 years ago, but there has lately been a marked increase, particularly in the past five years.

Discoveries in Ghana, in the wake of the coup which ousted the pro-Soviet Nkrumah regime in February 1966, uncovered dramatic evidence that the Soviets are pushing audio operations wherever they can in the West. On the recommendation of Soviet advisors, an audio surveillance unit termed Technical Unit 3 (TU-3) of the Ghanaian National Security Service was created in 1965. TU-3 had about 22 Ghanaian audio technicians assigned to it at the time of the coup and the table of organization actually called for additional personnel. Four of the technicians had been trained in the Soviet Union, the remainder in Ghana itself by KGB technical advisor Andrey Nikolayevich Andreyev who was in Accra from June to December 1965. The large stock of Soviet-supplied technical/operational equipment found in the well-equipped electronic workshops of the still-incomplete TU-3 headquarters (camouflaged as the "National Science Research Laboratories") included Soviet clandestine agent communications gear, surveillance transceivers, and transmitters and microphones for audio installations. The elaborate and costly Ghanaian facility, a KGB stepchild, was ostensibly intended to shore up and maintain internal security of the Nkrumah government; in fact, TU-3 with the direct participation of Andreyev and another KGB officer had already "bugged" two Accra hotels and was about to do the same job on five others. However, there can be no doubt but that the unit, under Soviet tutelage and on behalf of KGB interests, would ultimately have been directed against Western diplomatic missions, including American, had the coup not toppled the regime.

Although KGB and GRU use of recruited native Americans to install audio devices is by no means excluded, Soviet operations against indigenous employees of American overseas offices lend themselves particularly to audio installations as in the 1953-54 janitor operation mentioned above. A more recent example occurred in 1965, when the KGB recruited the butler of an American ambassador for the purpose of having him place a small microphone-transmitter under the ambassador's dining room table. A slight variation occurred in another country at about the same time. A local employee of an embassy of a NATO country, working in the office of the Military Attache of that country, confessed to being a KGB agent and to having been instructed to report in advance whenever the American Defense Attache was scheduled to visit the agent's superior. His KGB handler said he would then give the agent a battery-operated device to be placed under the table or desk to record the conversation between the two attaches.

Techniques of miniaturization and electronic sophistication have long since developed to the point where devices such as those referred to above can be easily and rapidly emplaced by an agent with access to offices of interest. For example, a slim block of milled wood less than 12 inches long was found attached to the rear of a bookcase in the library/conference room of an American embassy in the Middle East in early 1967. It contained a Soviet-built transmitter and microphone, a control switch receiver (by ich the device could be turned on or shut off . . . ill by an electronic signal from outside the embassy) and a self-contained battery power supply. To apply such a device, shorter than a common ruler and not much thicker, requires less than 10 seconds. The agent has only to press it firmly against a wood surface. It is then held in place by sharp, built-in tacks at each end.

In August 1967 another Soviet microphone-transmitter device, essentially identical to that described above, was discovered attached to the underside of a bookcase in the office of the American Charge d'Affaires in a central African republic where there is a strong KGB representation. Numerous tack holes under the same bookcase and under a similar bookcase in the vacant office of the former ambassador gave evidence that at least two audio devices of the same type had been successfully put into place in the two offices over a period of months and had been periodically removed, probably for replacement of batteries, then re-emplaced.

In both 1967 cases mentioned here Soviet success was the outgrowth of an "inside" agent operation exploiting full knowledge of the pattern of embassy activity and ready access to the selected target rooms. With respect to the Middle East case, the embassy library/conference room was on the ground floor adjoining the reception area where, during working hours, a local employee was on duty. Normally, except when a conference was scheduled, the library had been accessible to all embassy personnel including local employees. In the Africa case, the embassy in question, located in one section of a large commercial and apartment building, was lacking a Marine guard force for maximum physical security at night and on weekends. In addition, local employees had freedom of movement throughout the installation during duty hours.



Wood block with cover removed. Note built-in tacks at each end.



Components as identified by X-ray photo



Quickly emplaced by pressing to underside of bookcase

FIGURE 14. SOVIET MICROPHONE AND TRANSMITTER DEVICE FOUND IN AN AMERICAN EMBASSY, 1967

V. REVIEW OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND GAMBITS

The case examples cited so far to illustrate KGB and GRU use of staff and agent personnel against Americans abroad have reflected various operational techniques and gambits employed by the Soviet intelligence officer to spot his targets, to gain direct or indirect access to them, and to assess them in the unceasing search for vulnerability or susceptibility. This section will review some of these techniques—and refer to others not yet mentioned—and seek to put them into focus on a broader basis without reference to individual types of targets.

Although various Soviet Intelligence doctrinal concepts about Americans abroad have already become clear (i.e., that junior employees are, in effect, "second class citizens" and thus more vulnerable and that students are good targets because of their relative immaturity and lack of funds), there are other practical as well as doctrinal considerations that have much to do with the intensiveness of the Soviet effort against overseas Americans and the techniques employed.

Soviet View of the American Abroad Target

From the Soviet viewpoint, operations against Americans in overseas assignments outside the Bloc area are, generally speaking, easier and more rewarding than the same operations would be in the United States. Obviously, one factor in this consideration is the severity of FBI counterintelligence coverage which inhibits, if it does not entirely prevent, KGB and GRU efforts to recruit Americans at home. But there are other considerations as well and these largely relate to the Soviet image, based on experience, of the individual American outside his normal environment.

The average American, as the Soviets see him, goes abroad for basically materialistic and selfish reasons. The KGB summarizes this viewpoint in the following words.

> "Americans like to remain abroad for extended periods because of the various material benefits such as higher salaries, a chance to save money due to lower overseas living costs, certain tax exemptions, rent-free quarters, longer vacations, and the opportunity to engage in profitable foreign currency exchange."

Whatever the accuracy of the above observation, it is a known and recognized Soviet concept, unquestionably drawn from operational experience, that Americans away from home tend to let their guard down, to talk more freely, and to enter more freely into contact with foreigners, including Soviets. There is recognition, of course, that there are exceptions to the general rule, that in some areas Americans refuse to have contact with Soviet nationals and are increasingly prone to report contacts when they do take place. However, in principle and practice, the KGB and GRU work on the theory that overseas Americans in general, by their open conduct, talkative nature, and freedom of movement and associations, are relatively approachable—directly and indirectly—and that the entire operational process from spotting through development to recruitment is less difficult than in the United States.

An additional factor (mentioned earlier in a different context) also affects the intensity of the Soviet program against Americans and permits the often free-wheeling, shotgun approach techniques frequently employed abroad. This is Soviet knowledge that in working aggressively against Americans outside the United States, including recruitment and use of local agents against them, they are violating, in most cases, no local laws since the activity is not directed against the host country. Thus the Soviets, as well as their local agents, are not normally punishable in the event an operation against Americans fails and is exposed.

Use of Material Incentives

Soviet Intelligence literally believes that Americans will do almost anything for money, and the factor of material incentive is somewhere present

в обычновенное линейное управление того же учреждения. В таких условиях сотрудники государственных учреждений скрывает недовольство политикой своего правительства, боясь потерять работу. Для выявления их требуется помощь опытной агентуры или доверительных связей, используемых в качестве наводчиков.

Большое внимание в вербовочной работе в США уделяется вербовке как на материальной основе, так и на основе компрометирующих материалов.

Чтобы правильно использовать фактор материальной заинтересованности, необходимо, прежде всего, понимать психику американца, который трезво усматривает в деньгах единственное средство обеспечения его личной свободы и независимости, позволяющее ему удовлетворять материальные и духовные запросы. Такой подход к деньгам порождает у среднего американца неразборчивость в средствах их приобретения, иногда связанную с риском.

В то же время следует учитывать, что в США сравнительно высокий уровень жизни держится за счет ограбления народов других стран. Поэтому было бы неправильным полагать, что служащего правительственного учреждения США может заинтересовать сотрудничество с советской разведкой, оплачиваемое незначительными суммами. Чтобы внести ясность в этот вопрос целесообразно ознакомиться с размером зарплаты американцев, работающих в государственных учреждениях. Минимальная зарплата начинающего дипломата, например, составляет 600 долларов в месяц (необлагаемых налогом), а опытный дипломат получает свыше 1500 долларов в месяц. В то время как (по данным на 1960 г.) прожиточный минимум на семью из четырех человек в США составляет около 4000 долларов в год, а минимальное пособие по безработице равно лишь 504 долларам в год (штат Виргиния).

FIGURE 15. PAGE FROM TOP SECRET KGB TRAINING MANUAL (1962) ON RECRUITMENT OF AMERICANS

The middle paragraphs reflect one aspect of the Soviet Intelligence concept of Americans as materialistic and money hungry as cited in this chapter

in almost every type of recruitment operation. KGB doctrine on this matter is quite explicit.

> "The successful use of financial motivation in recruitment requires an understanding of the psychological makeup of the average American. He seriously thinks of money as the only thing which can ensure his personal freedom and independence and fulfill his material and spiritual needs. This typical American attitude toward money creates indifference to the means by which it is obtained, even though risk is sometimes involved. . . . Determination of an American's income is of extreme importance to his development and particularly to his recruitment."

The above quotation adds an additional and cynical facet to the Soviet image of Americans abroad. The overall accuracy of this image is not the important consideration. It is, however, the product of numerous successful Soviet recruitments of Americans, it influences KGB and GRU operational planning, and it explains why so frequently in developmental cases innocent-appearing questions are asked about salaries and financial difficulties and why offers of gifts and loans have become standard practice. Soviets in the West do not make loans or offer gifts unless authorized to do so; those who do are intelligence officers or their agents, and their motives are clearly professional rather than personal.

The Direct Social Approach

Devious and indirect Soviet methods of approaching Americans abroad are by no means uncommon, as has already been shown. But in the majority of *reported* cases the approach has been direct and on an initially social basis with many variations, sometimes extremely subtle, in the techniques of followup. These in each case, are tailored to the individual under cultivation.

The direct Soviet social approach to Americans abroad has been observed since approximately 1949. By 1951, it was evident that earlier Soviet policies which kept their personnel who were stationed outside the USSR in strict seclusion and precluded unofficial relations with Americans and other foreigners had been relaxed. By 1953, a definite trend of deliberate Soviet social contact with Americans abroad at varying official levels had been noted in at least 30 countries. The trend is now global in practice and its intelligence application has been formalized in official KGB operational instructions such as the following.

> "The intelligence officer must understand that establishing a confidential and unofficial relationship with an American is a step toward full recruitment and a clandestine relationship . . . the confidential relationship must be initiated in such a way that the American does not realize that he is in contact with an intelligence officer or suspect the officer's real intentions."
>
> "When striking up an unofficial acquaintance with an American government employee, it is very important not to alarm him by prematurely asking intelligence questions. Try to win the American's confidence and create a friendly relationship. It is important to stimulate his interest during conversation with him and to give a personal flavor to your own interest in certain topics."

Regardless of whether the social approach by the Soviet to the American is the outgrowth of a diplomatic or public function, a "chance" encounter or the result of an introduction at a bar or on the street or at a swimming club, the Soviet frequently takes the initiative. He is amiable, shows personal interest in his new acquaintance, possibly flatters him, and suggests a further meeting which may take the form of an invitation to a Soviet embassy reception, a Soviet film showing or a local performance by touring Soviet artists. Once one invitation is accepted, others follow—to sport events, to the theater, etc. As the KGB has noted:

> "Tickets to (these events) are sent or given to even slight acquaintances. Such gestures are regarded by Americans as quite innocent. During intermission our officer approaches his target American and engages him in conversation suitable to the occasion but really intended to make possible a followup relationship with him."

In many cases, particularly involving code clerks, secretaries and other junior-level personnel, the Soviet will resort in the early stages of cultivation to a form of friendly baiting designed to keep the American from reporting the new relationship. The Soviet will suggest, perhaps regretfully, that of course the American doesn't dare to meet with a Soviet without reporting on it to his (or her) security officer. Americans have been known to interpret such a suggestion as a slur on their personal freedom, to deny any need of reporting and to accept the implied challenge. This Soviet gambit shows a good understanding of the psychology of many Americans.

Typically, the hospitality soon broadens into family visits and outings, with small gifts to the

American target's wife and children. The KGB covers this aspect in the following words:

> "In order to solidify overtly achieved friendships with Americans, our officers under Soviet Embassy cover usually present gifts on New Years' Day or other appropriate occasions. The intelligence officer will deliver his gift in person at the American's home at a time when the latter is normally there. The purpose is to inject an unofficial, friendly flavor into the relationship. In return, the American usually responds by visiting the Soviet's home to present a gift."

As in the case of the American data processing technician in a Moslem country, language lessons are often brought into the picture at about this point. And it is here that the wife of the Soviet intelligence officer has been seen on many occasions to play a supporting operational role. Without specific reference to language lessons which are by now a standard developmental gambit, the KGB outlines the role of the Soviet wife in these words:

> "It is often helpful if the intelligence officer takes his wife with him when visiting the home of a person under development. With his wife's assistance, the officer can clarify certain points of information or assessment concerning the target individual and thereby determine how best to strengthen his relationship with him."

In the early stages of direct cultivation, conversation is on harmless topics, sport, art, life in each other's country, etc. The Soviet may say he is bored with life in a foreign country, perhaps bored with his own countrymen, lonely for new and stimulating companionship. Controversial subjects are avoided or glossed over. This whole preparatory process has a purpose; assessment of the American's potential usefulness for espionage and assessment of him from the standpoint of the possibility of recruitment. This requires knowledge of the American's personal history, his family situation, his financial standing (most important, as already indicated), his unfulfilled ambitions and possible weaknesses for women. During this assessment stage, the Soviet seeks to cement the friendship and at the same time—usually through gifts—create a sense of obligation for hospitality. Given the Soviet concept that money is the all-important American motivation, tactics may sometimes be ludicrously crude and include direct and very personal questioning about the American's income and debts, how much he pays for rent, the amount of his taxes, etc.

Sooner or later in the developmental process, assuming that the Soviets have concluded that they have an interesting prospect on the line, small aspects of clandestinity will be gradually inserted into the relationship. Less public and more unusual meeting places will be suggested. The target will be requested not to call the Soviet at his official number "to avoid embarrassment for you" and meetings may be suggested at pre-arranged times and places. All of this is conditioning for what may follow.

Eventually—perhaps within weeks, perhaps not for months—the Soviet purpose will begin to emerge, although at first it may not be recognizable, as in the case of the Vienna student already described. The Soviet will ask his American friend to help him collect information of an overt nature—perhaps for a journalist friend, possibly for a research paper or article which the Soviet himself claims he is writing, perhaps even for an informal public opinion poll. The Vienna student was asked for character assessments of his fellow Americans and saw nothing disturbing about the request. A European national in the Middle East, under Soviet cultivation because of his access to Americans, was dealt with somewhat more frankly by his Soviet officer. The request went something like this: "You know many people here. They will tell you what they won't tell me . . . they will speak more frankly to you than to me because I am a diplomat and represent a country that, unfortunately, does not find much favor with them. Therefore, as a personal favor, will you ask Mr. Blank, whom you know, what. . . ."

Requests of this kind, even for the most overt information, may be coupled with an offer of payment. If payment is accepted, a receipt will usually be requested under some plausible pretext. The process of gradual involvement is by this time well under way and elements of clandestinity and possible potential compromise factors already present.

Finally, one day, in an atmosphere of warm friendship and mutual trust, the recruitment process will be brought to a head with a request for information or a service that is clearly of an intelligence nature. Typically, generous financial rewards will be promised. If the American becomes frightened or refuses, he will be met at first with reasoned argument and renewed professions

of friendship. Depending on the course of the Soviet assessment and softening-up process, a harder line may follow: threats and warnings to think matters over—particularly if the American has already slipped over the line and exposed himself to compromise. Whatever the American's initial reaction, the Soviet, as in the case of code clerk Donald Ultan, will press for one or more additional meetings.

Miscellaneous Development and Recruitment Techniques

No hypothetical composite [illegible], or even a series of actual cases, can possibly illustrate the full range of Soviet operational practice employed to meet, develop and recruit Americans abroad. Several which have not yet been mentioned or are worth additional clarification and emphasis by way of warning are briefly discussed below.

Compromise

Although the KGB, by its own doctrine, regards financial inducement as normally the decisive factor in successful recruitment of Americans abroad, the element of compromise is also an essential part of each such operation. It is brought into play in ways which are often not fully appreciated.

From the viewpoint of Soviet Intelligence, any American who agrees to an unofficial and personal relationship with a Soviet and conceals the fact from his (or her) superiors has already taken a first compromising step. As the relationship deepens and becomes more intimate along typical lines, such as described above, each Soviet move is intended to increase the degree of compromise. By accepting the small aspects of clandestinity which are gradually introduced, such as not calling the Soviet at his official number or agreeing to meetings at unorthodox times and places, the American compounds his original compromise. The initially innocent small "favors" which the Soviet asks on the basis of friendship are a calculated part of the compromise process. So is the offer of payment and the seemingly plausible request for a signed receipt. Meanwhile, the Soviet through probing and other means uncovers indications of personal weakness and vulnerability (the presence of debt, excessive drinking, promiscuous sexual habits, etc.), which are treated as "secrets" between the American and his Soviet "friend" and thus also become part of the compromise web. The effect of this process over a period of time is to draw the American into a "confidential" relationship, from which the American gradually comes to realize that he cannot withdraw except at the cost of acute embarrassment—and perhaps severe personal consequences—by disclosing the compromise to his superiors.

Actually, the build-up and use of compromise by Soviet Intelligence is largely for psychological effect both during the period of development and at the time of recruitment is attempted. In operations in the West, the Soviets normally have no serious intention of using compromising information to blackmail an American into doing their bidding. Use of coercive threats to destroy an American's career by exposure of compromising information is a recruitment technique only rarely employed outside the Soviet Bloc area. This is because in Western countries the Soviets lack total control of the environment, such as they enjoy in the USSR, in their operations against Americans. It is thus difficult for them to acquire truly damaging evidence in a form which can be effectively exploited for blackmail.

In Moscow and the East European countries, however, blackmail is standard operational practice against Westerners, including Americans. Operating on their own grounds, the KGB and the cooperating Bloc services can work under controlled conditions to secure disasterously compromising evidence (usually photographic and/or recorded on tape) which is then used as a means of recruitment. The well-publicized case of Irwin Scarbeck, the Foreign Service officer stationed in Warsaw who became involved with a female Polish agent and was blackmailed into accepting recruitment, is only one of numerous examples of operations of this kind.

Sexual and Homosexual Approaches

A number of actual and incipient sexual approaches overseas to Americans outside the Communist Bloc have been mentioned both in detail and in passing reference in this study. Although the KGB attempt to recruit Eleanor, the Bonn embassy file clerk, was based on shock tactics and threats against her own safety and the life of her supposed American fiance, the operation against her was, in its opening stages, a clear-cut case of seduc-

tion which was accomplished in a matter of weeks. In the case of the embassy secretary in Africa whose local lover was in contact with a Soviet intelligence officer, it seems likely that her sexual involvement was to have been indirectly exploited on Soviet behalf. The AID Mission secretary in the Far East who accepted a letter from a Soviet visitor and apparently gave in to his romantic overtures prior to her turnover to a local KGB officer was almost certainly spotted in advance as being susceptible to this type of approach.

In at least one recent instance outside the Communist Bloc, the KGB is known to have recruited—then directed against Americans—a European homosexual. The recruitment itself was not on the basis of blackmail (the European made no secret of his homosexuality and had no fear of exposure on this score), but once the agent had been recruited, the Soviets sought to exploit the homosexual aspect. They financed the agent's move to an apartment suitable for entertaining and asked him to report on official Americans of his acquaintance who might be active or latent homosexuals. The agent was unsuccessful in this assignment, but if he had been able to identify and establish a compromising relationship with such a person, it is likely that the KGB would have considered blackmail as a recruitment technique. The KGB is known to regard evidence of homosexuality as particularly damaging information which is exploitable by blackmail.

Trips to the Communist Bloc

The KGB is known to have instructed its residencies, as part of the operational program against Americans abroad, to "find opportunities to organize trips to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies for targets under development." The reason for this technique is obvious. It gives the Soviets an opportunity, on their own grounds and at leisure, to assess an agent prospect in greater depth than is often possible in the West and to carry through the operation to recruitment under circumstances overwhelmingly favorable to them. (In some cases where recruitments have been made in the West, the new agent is taken to the USSR or to one of the Bloc countries for intensive training in his agent assignment. The KGB and GRU can arrange this without a Soviet visa showing in the American's passport.) Examples of such invitations are numerous and one will suffice to illustrate how they usually come about. Several years ago, an AID officer in Pakistan was cultivated on a social relationship basis by Leonid Gavrilovich Kuimov, an intelligence officer under diplomatic cover as a first secretary. In the now familiar pattern, the Soviet brought small gifts to the American's family and the two men before long were in the habit of seeing each other several times a week, often dropping in on one another. The Soviet finally asked for an AID Mission pocket telephone directory and was given an outdated and generally available copy. He then probed several times to see if the American might be interested in a "special deal" on a vacation trip to Moscow. When this was refused, the Soviet officer switched to a new tack; he urged the American to come to the USSR for a period and accept work as a teacher. "It would be a valuable experience," he said, "and you would be highly paid."

The Soviets are also interested in attracting to the USSR as tourists persons whom they have spotted as potential recruitment targets. For example, in 1966 three female Peace Corps volunteers in Turkey visited the Ankara office of Intourist, the Soviet travel agency, to arrange a tourist trip to the USSR. While in the office, they met three Soviets (all of them intelligence officers) who were persistent in attempts to cultivate them. A short time later, the local Peace Corps director persuaded the volunteers to cancel their plans for the trip. When the local Intourist representative, a KGB agent, was told of the cancellation, he promptly lowered his previously set "minimum" price for the tour from $250 to $102. (The Peace Corps, of course, is an attractive target for Soviet Intelligence since many former volunteers have entered U.S. Government service and others can be expected to do so in future. Various types of Soviet efforts at cultivation of Peace Corps personnel have been reported from Africa, the Middle East and Asia.)

False Flag

The Soviet technique of "false flag" cultivation or attempted recruitment has been illustrated several times and is mentioned again for emphasis because it is extremely hard to recognize or detect until the Soviet hand comes out in the open (if it ever does). In its purest form the Soviet hand should not show at all since the essence of this

technique involves the recruiter (Soviet national or non-Soviet agent) pretending to represent a non-Soviet intelligence service or commercial or industrial organization, in cases where the American target is considered unlikely to have any affinity for the Soviet cause. An American of German extraction might be asked to covertly help his country of origin or an American of Jewish faith might be asked to serve the Israeli intelligence service. The Department of State communications technician, whose case has been described, was asked to collaborate with the intelligence service of his East European country of ethnic origin—yet the operation was Soviet and involved a Soviet Illegal. The Ultan case was a variation of the same basic technique.

Gambits for Contact

The variety of ways in which Soviet intelligence seeks to open up initial contact with Americans abroad and to ensure the prospect of follow-up meetings is impressive. In the case histories already described, we have seen Soviet officers approach Americans on the street, in bars, at private parties and receptions, through the intermediary of other nationals, etc. A KGB instructional document makes further suggestions:

> "In order to widen the scope of his cover for meeting Americans . . . the intelligence officer may engage in sports, actively concern himself with certain aspects of science or art, or take up a hobby. Examples include fishing, tennis, stamp collecting and coin collecting."

The above instructions have been faithfully followed in every part of the world and actually improved on. Soviets, as already shown, have organized games such as the volley ball series played in Vienna, have sought out Americans to give language lessons to themselves or their wives and have taken to frequenting bowling alleys and even marine guard quarters abroad. Grigoriy Iosifovich Goncharov, a GRU officer recently in Rabat, spent a good part of his time on the beach looking for American military personnel with whom he could strike up an informal acquaintance. A few years ago in Syria it was noted that Konstantin Mozel, a Soviet intelligence officer, was in the habit of spending the greater part of three days a week at the diplomatic community swimming pool, engaging English-speaking wives in conversation while their husbands were at work.

In Tripoli the KGB instruction about stamp collecting was taken quite literally by Soviet intelligence personnel. Some of them were seen carrying folders of postage stamps about town and using them to strike up conversations in bars, cafes and other public places. If the person approached in this manner admitted an interest in stamps, the Soviet would hand over his packet, suggest that the potential target take it home to study and decide which exemplars he would like to have. This, of course, would open the door to another meeting at which stamps would indeed be discussed, and possibly exchanged, but the bulk of the time would be spent by the Soviet officer in building rapport, eliciting biographic and employment information and laying the groundwork for subsequent meetings.

The GRU showed considerable ingenuity in staging an incident in Brussels in 1966 which was intended to bring one of their officers into contact with an American female employee of the MAAG Mission. Returning home one day, the American woman found a Soviet female, apparently ill, leaning against the wall outside her door. Her agitated male companion, Vladimir I. Cheretun who posed as Aeroflot representative in Belgium, asked if he could bring his wife into the American home to rest. Once inside, the Soviet female (never identified) made a rapid recovery while Cheretun attempted to ingratiate himself with the American woman. He made a second—and unsuccessful—attempt at cultivation a few months later by approaching the American on the street. Cheretun was apprehended by Belgian authorities in 1967 and forced to leave the country because of his intelligence activities.

VI. CONCLUSION

The efforts of Soviet Intelligence to obtain secret information through recruitment of Americans and penetration of U.S. installations abroad are, as this study has shown, world-wide in scope, massive in proportions, tenacious and persistent, and often highly imaginative. KGB and GRU targets are varied and include private as well as official Americans. But the most aggressive operational activity is directed against junior employees of diplomatic and other official establishments and against enlisted personnel of the military services. Priority is given to code and communications personnel, Marine guards, file clerks and secretaries, a broad grouping which the Soviet regard as particularly vulnerable and relatively easy to approach.

The KGB doctrinal concept of the average American, his psychological makeup, materialistic nature and primary interest in money and how to make more of it, which this study has documented, is a challenging one and may seem grossly distorted to most readers. Nevertheless, it has obviously proven to be true in many individual cases in which the Soviets have made successful and highly rewarding recruitments. As a sweeping generalization, the concept has been proven in error by many Soviet recruitment failures, even after careful assessment and preparation. The record shows that Americans as a group are loyal to their country and have proven harder for the Soviets to recruit than any other nationality. However, this advantage is partially offset by the fact that the United States is "the main enemy" and the KGB and GRU devote more time and effort to recruitment operations against Americans than nationals of any other country.

There is no reason to doubt the validity of the Soviet experience that it is easier to recruit Americans abroad than in the United States, nor of the Soviet view that the American overseas tends to have his guard down, to talk freely about himself, to associate without suspicion with foreigners. The Soviets take full advantage of the off-duty freedom of movement and association which Americans have abroad. They find it relatively easy to establish direct personal contact for cultivation and assessment; they also manipulate a variety of local non-Soviet agents and willing collaborators.

Examples of many Soviet operational techniques have been shown in this study. Sometimes they are apparent, even obvious. But they are often subtle and indirect. Soviet methods of spotting, assessment, cultivation and recruitment are extremely varied and limited only by local operational resources and by the imagination of the Soviet intelligence officer. The effectiveness of these methods is conditioned by the degree of American appreciation of Soviet intentions, by understanding of Soviet techniques and a constant alertness to any possible manifestations of either.

It is most important to remember that Soviets in the West, as a general rule, are not permitted to make unofficial, social contacts with Americans unless there are intelligence reasons for doing so. Casual, seemingly non-contrived contact with a Soviet should be reported in all cases to appropriate security authorities. Abnormally inquisitive actions on the part of non-Soviets, especially regarding biographic information, private and official activities, and the personal financial status of American officials and employees abroad should be noted and reported. Security authorities will frequently possess, or are in a position to obtain, information identifying Soviet intelligence officers and their agents and are able to provide appropriate guidance.

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